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Executive Summary 
 
The incomes of Irish cattle farmers benefited greatly from the reform of the CAP for 
beef and cereals in 1992 and more recently under Agenda 2000. In both of these 
reforms the institutional support prices were reduced and animal-based direct 
payments (DPs) were used to compensate farmers for the anticipated market price 
reductions. 
 
This research study shows that the main reason why Irish cattle farmers gained under 
these reforms are that Ireland gets above the EU average benefit from DPs, but below 
average return from EU market price support. Therefore, the greater the switch-over 
to DPs the larger the income gain. 
 
Ireland’s above average benefits from DPs arises from the combined effect of the 
suitability of the structure of the DPs themselves and the extensive nature of the 
production systems used by Irish cattle farmers. 
 
This research also showed that over the years as the switch-over to animal-based DPs 
progressed, cattle production per se has become uneconomic. But, Irish cattle farmers 
needed the cattle and had to remain in cattle farming to get access to the DPs that are 
in fact the only income. 
 
The nature and structure of the 1992 and the Agenda 2000 CAP reforms have been 
such that cattle farmers and farming methods were becoming severely constrained by 
what could be described as “a mixture of administrative, economic and bureaucratic 
asphyxiation”. And, with cattle farming being so pervasive in Ireland, this affects 
most farmers within the country and other farm enterprises where they must co-exist. 
 
Income compensation for product price reductions was used to justify the introduction 
and continuation of the DPs in both the 1992 and the Agenda 2000 reforms. This is a 
very weak basis on which to justify a rather large taxpayer’s expenditure for either 
their continuation into the future or their extension to new entrants into farming. 
 
Under the Agenda 2000 reform, the value of the extensification premium (EP) was 
increased almost threefold but the operational rules were substantially altered. 
Consequently, the potential for extra revenue arising for Irish cattle farmers was 
substantial. However, the administrative compliance system was much more complex 
and very invasive in relation to animal management events, reducing the potential for 
use of improved genetics and production technology, with a progressive disconnect 
from the consumer market for beef.   
 
The Agenda 2000 agreement facilitated individual Member States with the once-off 
choice between two extensification operational systems, each with its own premium 
rates and related stocking density requirements. These were: 
• Option 1: a single payment of €100 (£79) per SBP and SCP collected, 
provided a farm unit stocking density limit of 1.4 LU per hectare is 
achieved 
 
OR 
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• Option 2: with two levels of payment depending on the stocking density 
o €80 (£63) at < 1.4 LU per hectare 
o €40 (£31.50) within the range of 1.4 and 1.8 LU per hectare. 
 
In preparation for the negotiations for the Agenda 2000 agreement, detailed and 
intricate research was undertaken and published on the economic and technological 
implications of these extensification options. The best extensification option for 
Ireland was evaluated on its relative ability to deliver revenue to cattle farmers and 
the implications for export competitiveness of Irish beef.  
 
Following extensive analysis of the policy options available and their likely impact it 
was concluded that Ireland would benefit most from availing of the Option 1 
extensification system. Option 1 would: 
• yield the highest revenue for the country 
• target a higher portion of the revenue towards the supply of cattle from the 
suckler herd which are of a higher quality relative to cattle from the dairy 
herd 
• target more of the revenue towards the poorer regions of the country where 
extensive production systems are already used 
• release the larger dairy farms plus the more market oriented cattle 
fattening farms from the stocking density  requirement  and the 
administrative bureaucracy associated with the DPs and extensification 
• best facilitate the production of quality finished animals for the higher 
priced beef markets within the EU. 
 
It was concluded that even if Option 2 was chosen, an increasing number of Irish 
cattle farmers will still aim for the 1.4 limit to get the higher of the two extensification 
premiums available to them, i.e. €80 rather than €40 per eligible animal. Furthermore, 
the incentive to do this will increase as: 
• calves become scarce and expensive as cow numbers decline in response 
to milk and suckler cow quota limits  
• the market price of beef declines once the lower Agenda 2000 price 
supports are implemented  
• more farmers opt to join REPS, with its associated more stringent nutrient 
and stocking density compliance criteria 
• more farmers secure off-farm employment which will lead to less labour 
intensive and operationally simpler cattle production systems. 
 
Under each extensification option the study found that there are substantial knock-on 
economic implications for land rents, forage costs, animal management activities and 
the degree of market orientation of cattle farming. The scale of the knock-on 
implications is directly related to both the extensification option chosen by the 
member state and financial incentive for the individual cattle farmers to participate in 
the scheme. 
 
The research showed that the extra land required per animal for extensification 
purposes also adds to the internal supply of feed (forage) resources per animal for the 
farm unit. Therefore, a positive (feed) rent arises from the extra land which in-turn 
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would serve to reduce the economic cost of forage, especially internally produced 
silage. Furthermore, for most cattle production systems availing of extensification, 
managing surplus grass would be problematic especially on farms with high quality 
land. Consequently, this surplus feed would have to be removed for grassland 
management reasons, most likely in the form of baled silage, and almost irrespective 
of the cost of its off-take. In such situations, there would be very limited technical or 
economic reasons for cattle farmers to “import” onto the farm externally purchased 
feeds in the form of concentrates, almost irrespective of price. 
 
From an inter-country comparison perspective, the overall conclusion arising from the 
research was that Ireland may be the only EU member state that would economically 
benefit from using Option 1 with its single EP and a stocking density limit of 1.4. 
However, when a choice became available under the Agenda 2000 agreement the 
authorities in Ireland chose to implement Option 2, despite its economic 
disadvantages, presumably because as the EU Court of Auditors report states “it 
allows more producers to benefit”.  
 
The choice of Option 2 suggests an implicit trading away of the possibilities for 
obtaining both extra EU revenue and increased export competitiveness from EPs 
against a more ubiquitous distribution of the payments among Irish cattle farmers 
from a lower overall financial pool.  This choice had multiple revenue and income 
distribution implications together with competitiveness consequences for Irish cattle 
farming in both the immediate years and subsequently when the animal-based DPs 
were decoupled and converted to the Single Farm Payment (SFP) system. Therefore, 
the choice of extensification Option 2 would prove to be particularly advantageous for 
the more intensive cattle farmers both in the immediate and longer term.  
 
The perceptible financial benefit is completely transparent for the farmer who actually 
receives the animal-based DP per se, hence the apparent attraction of availing of 
Option 2. However, as our earlier research demonstrated, there are also significant 
indirect financial benefits arising for cattle farmers from the animal-based DP system 
as a consequence of the capitalisation of a portion of the value of the DPs into cattle 
cohort prices. In general, the main indirect beneficiaries of the capitalisation process 
are the farmers who breed and/or rear young animals, i.e. primarily farmers with 
dairy-cow and/or suckler-cow based cattle enterprises. This occurs at the expense of 
those farmers who may actually collect the animal-based DPs but are at the fattening 
or finishing stages of the cattle production chain. Therefore, farmers involved in the 
breeding and rearing segment benefit both directly and indirectly from the animal-
based DP system. It is, however, rather difficult to precisely predict both the scale and 
the ultimate destination of the redistribution of these indirect benefits due to the 
relatively high level of inter-farm trading and the pervasive nature of cattle farming in 
Ireland.  
 
A detailed analysis of trends in the actual margins derived from cattle enterprise on 
farms in the National Farm Survey (NFS) showed that cattle farmers’ incomes in 
Ireland have benefited greatly from the CAP reform in 1992 and likewise from the 
more recent Agenda 2000 agreement. Yet, the disillusionment about the future for 
Irish cattle farming continued, even post the Agenda 2000 agreement. Most of this is 
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related to the operational aspects and the compliance criteria of the animal-based DP 
income support system.  
 
Although the overall margin for cattle was largely maintained in nominal values, an 
increasing proportion was being derived from the DPs. As a consequence, farmers 
were becoming progressively entwined in a bureaucratic compliance web and 
increasingly detached from beef markets and consumers. For many farmers the 
margins being derived from cattle production per se were both small and declining. 
 
For those specialising in fattening/finishing systems, the market-based margin had 
effectively disappeared mainly as a consequence of the capitalisation of a significant 
portion of the value of the animal-based DPs into the prices of the animals they were 
purchasing. In the absence of the animal-based DPs, such cattle enterprises would be 
considered unprofitable and would therefore cease production forthwith. But if they 
exited cattle production they would not have access to the DPs which were effectively 
both their “enterprise” margin and income.  
 
Since the payments continued to be based on the possession of certain types of 
animals which have to be “farmed” within specified stocking density limits, cattle 
production per se had become uneconomic and is increasingly being wedged in a 
cost-price squeeze. This was particularly so for those farmers involved in cattle 
fattening.  
 
Under the various CAP reforms, production costs for the individual cattle farmer have 
been increasing due to the additive impact of: 
• the quota restrictions (milk and suckler-cows) on the supply of calves which 
results in high calf prices, plus 
• the added cost complication for calf prices arising from the capitalisation of a 
portion of the values of the animal-based DPs  
• the ever increasing land base needed to achieve the stocking density limits 
required to collect the direct payments which have in effect become the only 
margin and/or income 
• the ever increasing land base needed to collect the higher value extensification 
premium, thereby increasing marginal land rents and distorting feed costs, and 
• the universal increases in costs arising from subsequent inflation. 
 
It was therefore concluded that such a DP based income support system provides very 
limited scope for the individual farmer to manage costs and/or adjust production 
methods to reflect the final and generally declining market value of the beef carcass.  
The end result is that: 
• there is no market return from producing the beef animal per se 
• farmers have less and less control of the margins they can obtain from their 
animals  
• the overall revenue in the sector is fixed and a declining portion of it is derived 
from the market as the value of the carcass declines in response to the 
reductions in beef support prices, but  
• costs are increasing and these are mainly driven by the compliance criteria for 
the animal-based DPs, more expensive calves and land. 
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For Irish cattle farmers the growing institutional complexities of the animal-based DP 
system, and especially the extensification element of it, was seriously distorting the 
inherent economics and husbandry of farming and this income support system was 
becoming progressively more unsustainable.  
 
The structural weaknesses identified in the existing animal-based DP system result in 
an inequitable distribution of the payments themselves and a leakage of much of their 
value into input and operational costs. Deficiencies identified include: 
• the administrative complexities and the operational costs of the payment 
system itself 
• the poor targeting of the payments due to inherent structural weaknesses 
within the DP system 
• the knock-on effects of the payment system in relation to: 
• beef production costs and 
• the lack of reward for good animal husbandry practices and for 
producing quality beef 
• the absence of any clear benefit to either society and/or the taxpayer from 
a rather large expenditure. 
 
With this animal-based DP income support system, average incomes within the 
aggregate cattle sector cannot increase unless the numbers of cattle farmers decline. 
But Irish cattle farmers, because of their circumstances, have been largely ineligible 
for the Farm Retirement Scheme.  The end result is the farmer has to stay in beef 
production although there is no profit in cattle production per se. But the farmer 
needs the cattle to get access to the direct payments that are in fact the income.   
 
A similar economic situation exists for most cereal farmers who wish to scale-up their 
activities to maintain or increase their income. The margin and almost all of the 
income is in the DPs but access to extra “eligible land” is required to draw down more 
DPs.  
 
As a consequence, on many Irish farms, even where land is suitable for a range of 
enterprises, the optimum enterprise mix is becoming an issue of establishing the best 
balance between: 
• the increasing value of the DPs for the individual enterprises, and  
• the costs related to the compliance criteria for the DPs for the 
individual enterprises.  
 
For individual farmers, most of the financial rewards are derived from “playing by the 
rules of the DP system” rather than from practising good animal and grassland 
husbandry.  
 
As outlined in various publications arising from this research, in Ireland when the EU 
commodity-based DP system is combined with the traditional pattern of land 
inheritance and the increased availability of off-farm employment there will be very 
limited land available for restructuring of farms. This almost fossilisation of farm 
structures for both the cattle and cereals enterprises will increase unit costs over a 
number of years and will have a similar knock-on impact on other farm enterprises.   
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These research findings reinforce the earlier evidence on the desirability and the need 
to develop a more suitable alternative DP income support system, see End of Project 
Report No. 4313 and related publications. This research outlined a framework 
template by which most of the structural weaknesses of the existing animal-based DP 
system could be rectified by de-coupling the DPs from eligible animals and 
converting them into a mainly area-based whole farm payment system with more 
suitable compliance criteria to distribute DPs to farmers. Within the current project 
further development work was undertaken on the decoupling template for an 
alternative multi-commodity framework for administering DPs within the EU. Also, a 
range of “public goods” were identified which could be incorporated into this 
framework to provide a much stronger conceptual basis for continuing DP income 
supports into the future. The framework and related concepts were published in a 
number of formats to obtain feedback from stakeholders and policy makers. From an 
Irish perspective, this new concept was described in operational terms as “… using a 
schedule similar to the Farm Retirement Scheme (FRS) but with the Rural 
Environment Protection Schemes (REPS) type requirements.” 
 
If this, or a similar, EU policy framework was implemented, cattle farming in Ireland 
could revert to a situation where: 
• the market based margin of sales value less direct costs will determine the 
animal numbers, type, carcass weights, slaughter dates, stocking densities 
and the mix of internal and external feed used, and 
• the expenditure on concentrates and fertilisers will decrease to reflect the 
decline in animal and crop prices, animal numbers and the changes in the 
farm enterprise mix. 
 
Preliminary estimates for Ireland suggest that compared to 1999, annual expenditure 
reductions on purchased feeds and fertilisers could be of the order of €190 (IR£150) 
and €60 (IR£50) million respectively.  This would be the equivalent of about one 
million tonnes of concentrates and about 300,000 tonnes of fertilisers. 
 
A similar restructuring of beef production would occur in other EU Member States 
and this, with an appropriate time lag, would reduce beef supplies and restore market 
balance in the EU. The historical evidence available from this project and an earlier 
related research on cattle prices would suggest that Ireland has most to gain in terms 
of market access and beef prices from an improved market balance within the EU. 
 
Fully rectifying the structural weaknesses of the existing animal-based DP system 
through decoupling could be tedious as any such major policy reforms at EU level are 
by their nature slow and difficult to achieve. Moves in this direction might be possible 
within the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the Agenda 2000 reforms due in 2002/03. 
Already the stated EU agricultural policy objectives outlined in the Agenda 2000 
proposals indicated that the direction of this change was beginning to crystallise and  
the Agenda 2000 agreement converted the animal-based disadvantaged/less favoured 
areas payments to a completely area-based system. 
 
Meanwhile, Ireland could have implemented immediately an interim but partial 
solution by availing of the option provided under the Agenda 2000 agreement for a 
single extensification payment system. Then, eligible animals on farms stocked at 1.4 
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LU/ha or lower would receive an extensification premium of €100 (IR£79) each. But, 
all other farmers and their related land area, steers, heifers, cows and cereal area could 
be farmed outside the stocking density constraints of the extensification system. In 
addition, the national revenue take from extensification would be maximised and beef 
export competiviness would be enhanced. 
 
In the autumn of 2000, just as a renewed level of confidence was beginning to emerge 
among Irish cattle farmers another BSE crisis occurred, first in France and later in 
Germany and Spain. In response, beef consumption levels declined abruptly and 
markets were effectively re-nationalised and normal trade flows for beef and live 
cattle were severely disrupted. These market problems were swiftly reflected in cattle 
prices in Ireland, especially for cull-cows and the lower grades of cattle. As a 
consequence, farmers faced many uncertainties, in the past DP “top-ups” were paid to 
support their incomes but now this might not be possible due to EU budget 
constraints. The BSE related market and trading complications were further 
accentuated in 2001 following a substantial outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease 
(FMD) in the UK and a related but isolated incident in Ireland.   
 
In response to the decline in demand and consumer confidence, a suite of EU wide 
supply control and consumer rebuilding measures were introduced. The main EU 
policy initiatives were: 
• the mandatory testing of all carcasses from cattle over 30 months 
• the immediate introduction of a scheme for Purchase For Destruction (PFD) 
of over 30 month animals at a guaranteed price 
• the redefinition of eligible suckler-cows for SCP compliance 
• changes in premium rights within the DP scheme, and  
• intervention purchases under special conditions.   
 
The economic impact of these policy initiatives were analysed in detail and the 
findings and related recommendations were made available to policy makers and 
stakeholders. Surprisingly, despite all of the market disruption and turbulence arising 
from the BSE and FMD predicaments, the annual incomes of Irish cattle farmers were 
largely maintained throughout this period. This was achieved by a combination of the 
EU policy initiatives such as the PFD and through periodic and prudent adjustments 
by the Minister for Agriculture of the phasing of the annual pay-out rates for the DPs.  
 
The policy changes in the Agenda 2000 agreement were scheduled to apply until the 
end of 2006 and were to be fully phased-in by 2003. A Mid Term Review (MTR) was 
also planned for 2003 with a general expectation that any further policy adjustments 
arising would be rather benign. However, post the BSE and FMD crises, it was 
becoming increasingly evident that EU society was placing a declining value on extra 
units of food production, or perhaps negative value for beef, but an increasing value 
on any public goods consumed in the production process. Therefore, an emerging 
rebalancing issue for future EU policy would be the farm mix of agricultural 
production and public goods that EU society is prepared to support financially.  
 
Against expectations, when the EU Agenda 2000 MTR proposals were published in 
2002 it was recommended that all crop and animal-based DPs be converted into area 
type payments. This EU policy shift to a decoupled Single Farm Payment (SFP) 
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outlined in their MTR proposals was almost identical to the concepts, architecture and 
compliance requirements for the framework template developed by the authors and 
published under this project and its predecessor.  
The EU proposal for the SFP was initially rejected by both the Irish and French 
authorities and by almost all of the Irish farm organisations plus the agri-business 
representative bodies. There was a general reluctance to fully embrace the concept of 
decoupling the product-based payments presumably due to concerns in relation to: 
• a probable re-distribution within farming itself of the indirect benefits and 
costs associated with the animal-based DPs, and   
• the future cost and revenue implications for the farm organisations themselves 
and agri-business arising from anticipated reductions in the volumes of both 
farm inputs used and outputs produced, together with  
• the knock-on impacts on business turnover and margins plus member 
subscriptions to the appropriate representative organisations.  
 
However, the feedback obtained from a series of seminars and presentations on the 
MTR decoupling proposals made at farmer and agri-business meetings was rather 
different. And it was entirely consistent with the earlier reaction obtained to the 
decoupling concepts and methodology developed within this project and its precursor. 
For most farmers it was immediately obvious that the SFP could release them from 
the administrative, economic and bureaucratic straightjacket into which they had 
progressively become enveloped with the various phases of CAP reform since 1992. 
After a decade of EU policy reforms, the SFP system provided farmers with their first 
realistic prospect of maintaining the future value of their existing DPs without the 
need for endless counts of eligible and non-eligible animals, matching dates of birth 
of animals with applications for premiums and critical census dates, and two separate 
methods of determining stocking densities.  
 
Similar feedback through various institutional channels led within months to a volte-
face on the Irish stance in relation to the SFP proposal, much to the surprise of most 
of the other EU Member States but especially France which was strongly opposed to 
the entire decoupling concept. In January 2003, the EU Agricultural Council agreed 
the CAP reforms including the SFP based on historical individual farm entitlements. 
In June 2003, however, modifications were agreed which gave Member States a 
degree of choice in the implementation of decoupling, but Ireland elected to 
implement the system as originally proposed in the MTR and to its original time 
schedule. 
 
The EU policy shift from the product-based DP system to the SFP could provide 
future scope and opportunities for Ireland to differentiate, re-position or even re-brand 
Irish farm products, especially for beef within EU and in other markets. To advance 
this prospect, a series of papers on aspects and implications of such a market 
segmentation approach to the evolving the EU food production policy were prepared 
and presented at professional international conferences.  These papers also elaborated 
on how the earlier EU policy shift from product-based price support to DP system(s) 
of various formats had impacted on the economics of production per se, resource 
conservation and the mix of private and public costs and benefits arising.  
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These papers also suggested that there was greater potential under the SFP for future 
EU farming systems to better exploit more eco-friendly production methods and 
produce a more diverse range of food products. However, a comprehensive economic 
exploitation these opportunities would require: 
• a further definition of the compliance criteria for the farming systems, together 
with  
• the formulation of appropriate marketing strategies to exploit the increasingly 
diverse consumer markets arising from the combination of: 
o the general rise in economic prosperity, and  
o the progressive enlargement  of the EU itself. 
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1. Aims and objectives 
 
The Agenda 2000 agreement, with a projected lifespan of seven years became 
operational on January 1st 2000. This was essentially a further phase of the MacSharry 
CAP reforms for beef and cereals initiated in 1992, but with added emphasis on the 
incentive to extensify farming methods. In both of these reforms the institutional 
support prices were reduced and direct payments (DPs) were used to compensate 
farmers for anticipated product price reductions.  
 
Within a decade, the annual EU expenditure on DPs has more than doubled, appendix 
Table 1. However, the mix of expenditure on individual DPs: Suckler Cow Premium 
(SCP), Special Beef Premium (SBP) and Extensification Premium (EP) has also 
changed greatly over the years.  
 
Irish cattle farmers benefited significantly from the DP system and like most of the 
overall EU, the mix of individual payments drawn-down gradually evolved, see 
appendix Table 2. In contrast to the overall EU, the revenue mix in Ireland has greater 
reliance on SBP and extensification, reflecting both the structure of the DPs system 
itself, the composition of the cattle herd and farming methods used. 
  
Under Agenda 2000, the value of the DPs for suckler (beef) cows, steers and bulls 
were increased. The increase in the value of the extensification premium was even 
larger but the criteria for access to this premium were significantly restructured.  
  
The extensification premium scheme was first introduced through the 1992 reforms to 
compensate specialised beef farmers for the competitive, concentrate feed cost, 
advantage enjoyed by intensive and semi-intensive beef producers arising from a 
reduction in the institutional support prices for cereals. The extensification premium 
system, through its stocking density requirement, provided a direct link between 
animal numbers and the forage producing capacity of cattle producing farms.  
 
The value of the extensification premium and the access criteria were adjusted 
periodically since its initiation in 1992, see summary of details in appendix Table 3.  
Under the Agenda 2000 agreement, Member States were offered a choice of either a 
single threshold system (Option 1) or a two-tier system (Option 2). Option 1 was 
contained in the original Agenda 2000 proposals while Option 2 emerged during the 
negotiations of the agreement itself. 
 
At farm level, the extensification premium was administered as a “top up” payment 
on animals that had already collected either an SBP or an SCP. The maximum 
stocking rate eligibility requirement for SBP and SCP was set at 2.0 LU/ha and this 
was derived with reference to the maximum acceptable 170 kg N/ha from organic 
sources laid down in the Nitrates directive. The farmers access to extensification 
payments was restricted to lower stocking densities, but again these have been 
adjusted periodically, see appendix Table 3. 
 
The calculation of stocking densities for extensification as operated under the 
MacSharry reforms only took into consideration the animals for which there was an 
application made for either SCP or SBP.  Within this enumeration process, the 
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possibility existed for the presence on the farm of other “ghost” grazing animals such 
as those ineligible for DPs, like heifers.  But under Agenda 2000, the methods of 
computing the stocking densities were considerably more stringent compared to the 
MacSharry period, and therefore there were reduced possibilities for ghost animals to 
exist on the farm, see appendix Table 4.  
 
Probably of greater significance from an Irish cattle farming perspective was the 
extent of the evolution of the extensification payment top-up both in value terms per 
se (appendix Table 3) and as a proportion of the animal-based DPs (appendix Table 
5), especially under the Option 1 system.  ` 
 
The focus of the research undertaken under this project was to: 
• determine the scale of the financial incentive under Agenda 2000 for the 
individual farmer to extensify production 
• compare the financial attractiveness of extensification under Agenda 2000 
with that of the MacSharry reform 
• identify and quantify the economic and technical implications of the 
extensification system for cattle production systems, feed resource costs and 
land use in Ireland 
• evaluate the impact of the extensification system on the relative 
competitiveness of Irish beef production 
• develop alternative policies and administrative operational procedures to 
ameliorate the most undesirable aspects of the existing DP system in 
preparation for the Mid-Term Review of the Agenda 2000 agreement 
scheduled for 2002/2003 
• develop and prepare more suitable and acceptable longer-term policies for all 
farm enterprises within the EU, with particular emphasis on the decoupling of 
all of the product-based DPs. 
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2. Approach and Methods 
 
In an overall sense this project was an extension in time (2000 to 2004) of project No. 
4313 and used a similar approach which had the twin research strategies of: 
 
• devising a more strategic approach to the evolution of a single EU beef market 
through better functioning of the existing CAP system, while simultaneously, 
 
• devising a more suitable long term EU policy in relation to the format and 
function of the entire DP system of income support.  
 
To achieve the interim objective of a better functioning of the EU “single” beef 
market under the existing CAP system, an in-depth evaluation of the entire structure 
of EU policy was undertaken. This also included an evaluation and analysis of various 
on-going EU policy modification proposals in response to the rapidly evolving market 
for beef. The resultant findings would be made available as promptly as possible, 
mainly in non-peer review professional and technical papers, review articles and 
through seminars and workshop for farmers, agri-business and other stakeholders, 
including policy makers. The main objective was to directly and indirectly influence 
policy formation at both the conceptualisation and implementation stages.  
 
During the lifespan of the project five working papers were prepared and published on 
various aspects of EU policy for beef. Initially, draft working papers were prepared 
and circulated to a number of experts for critique and comment1. Following any 
necessary revisions, the actual working papers were then published to facilitate 
further public discussion on these very important topics. The authors consistently 
invited comments and observations on their analysis and conclusions. In addition a 
number of conference papers and a range of non-peer review articles were prepared to 
encourage public discussion and feedback on the issues involved and assist in the 
further development of alternative policy concepts and related implementation 
procedures. 
 
The topics evaluated in the working papers prepared and published under project No. 
4313 were: 
• Inter-country comparisons of cattle prices 
• An evaluation of the intervention system and the labelling regulations 
• An evaluation of the operation of Aids to Private Storage 
• Inter-country comparisons for Direct Payments and Total Revenue for beef 
• Direct payments and cattle margins in Ireland. 
 
Because of its evolving economic importance for grassland farming and especially 
cattle farming in Ireland, most of the research undertaken within this project (4831) 
related to a comprehensive evaluation of the entire extensification payment system 
with its many implications and ramifications. As a result of this research two 
additional working papers were prepared and published, these were: 
                                                          
1 The authors would particularly like to acknowledge the observations and insightful comments 
received from the following Teagasc staff: Liam Connolly, Michael Drennan, Gerry Keane, Eamonn 
Pitts, Maurice Roche and Bernard Smyth. Valuable comments and observations were also received 
from Richard Healy, Head  of  Beef Division, Department of Agriculture.   
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• Extensification: an analysis of national and competitiveness issues 
• Extensification: implication for cattle farming in Ireland. 
 
Under both the Agenda 2000 proposals and the agreement itself, farm stocking 
densities were the key determinant in defining access to a range of options for 
extensification payments. Farmers could enhance their access to extensification 
payments by adjusting the stocking densities on their farms by either of two 
alternative methods, shedding animals or renting-in land. In addition to changing the 
extent of the access to the extensification payment options, adjusting stocking 
densities could also have significant implications for the optimum on-farm mix of 
internal versus external feed resources. In essence, land had a cost in relation to feed 
resource supply but it also had a value with respect to possible access to extra revenue 
from extensification payments. 
 
A series of computer spreadsheets were developed to estimate the net cost of land for 
forage (silage and grass) production based on both its estimated value for accessing 
DPs and its opportunity rental cost. The primary aim was to determine the best 
stocking density options for maximising the overall farm gross margin2. In addition, 
these programmes provided an estimate of the cost of producing the forage over the 
relevant range of stocking densities using both of the alternative methods for 
manipulating stocking densities. This facilitated a cost comparison between internally 
produced forage for both grass and silage and that for externally purchased 
concentrate feed. 
    
Previous related research3 in Ireland identified a number of serious structural  
weaknesses in the EU animal-based DP system for farm income support and 
alternative policy options were developed. To ameliorate the weaknesses identified, 
the approach was to develop a generalised EU policy concept for all of the EU 
commodity-based payments for application throughout the region which could: 
• include commodities in addition to beef, and  
• increase the acceptability of such a system to other EU Member States and in 
an international trade (WTO) context. 
 
The administrative operational mechanisms for the Agenda 2000 agreement were 
essentially a further phase of the MacSharry CAP reforms but with added emphasis 
on the incentive to extensify farming methods. Therefore, the fundamental structural 
weaknesses of the animal-based DP system still remained. However, under the 
                                                          
2 The inter-disciplinary nature of this research traversed the normal boundaries of concepts, expertise 
and methodologies. Various colleagues in both Teagasc and UCD provided professional advice on the 
conceptualisation and analysis of this topic. The co-operation and assistance of the following are 
gratefully acknowledged: Dr’s Gerry Keane, Michael Drennan and Padriag O’Kiely of Grange 
Research Centre, Billy Fingleton and Ultan Shanahan of Rural Economy Research Centre, and Liam 
Connolly, National Farm Survey and Athenry Research Centre. Professional advice and support was 
also generously provided by Dr’s Patrick Caffrey and John O’Connell, Faculty of Agriculture, UCD. 
 
3 This related primarily to the capitalisation of much of the value of the animal-based DPs into present 
and future costs for DP eligible young animals and land rental charges, together with the progressive 
economic incentive for farmers to reorient their production systems towards the compliance criteria 
rather than the beef market per se, see Dunne 1996f and 1997e, Dunne and O’Connell 1998, 2000abcd 
and End of Project report No. 4313. 
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Agenda 2000 agreement the added policy shift from product price support to further 
increases in the value for the animal-based DPs would be expected to exacerbate the 
inherent structural weakness of the administrative mechanism already identified. 
 
A longitudinal analysis of trends in the composition of margins for a range of cattle 
enterprises on Irish farms within the Teagasc, National Farm Survey (NFS) was 
undertaken to test the hypothesis. The results were presented at various conferences 
and seminars including the Teagasc annual situation and outlook conference.  
 
All of the research results, plus a series of recommendations were made available at 
the beef consultative group meetings on Agenda 2000 that was established by the 
Minister for Agriculture4. In addition, presentations on the economic and technical 
impacts of the Agenda 2000 proposals together with those for the subsequent 
agreement were also made at meetings and seminars for farmers, agri-business 
groups, and other stakeholders and policymakers. These meetings and seminars also 
provided an ideal forum to obtain feedback on the alternative policy options being 
developed. 
 
The Agenda 2000 agreement was scheduled to apply until 2007 with a Mid Term 
Review (MTR) in 2002/2003. However, an unanticipated and serious upheaval of the 
beef market occurred as a result of the 2nd BSE crisis in 2000 and 2001 but this time 
in continental EU Member States. In response, a range of unforeseen EU policy 
adjustments were proposed, agreed and implemented forthwith for both the beef price 
support arrangements and for the DP mechanism. These included adjustments to the 
structural aspects of the payments per se and their compliance access conditions. As a 
response to emerging market and administrative uncertainties and the consequential 
information deficits, an analysis was urgently undertaken of the evolving policy 
adjustments and their immediate and longer-term implications for farm incomes and 
future beef exports. The findings arising were made available at the ad hoc working 
group meetings in the Department of Agriculture and to stakeholders through various 
seminars, conferences and publications.  
 
The BSE related policy initiatives undertaken to reduce beef supplies, increase the 
value of and adjust the conditions for access to DPs served to only further compound 
the structural weaknesses already identified as inherent in the administration of the 
animal-based DP system. In essence, the inherent rigidity and weaknesses of the 
entire administrative system were becoming more and more obvious.  
 
Most likely as a consequence of the rapidly evolving policy complexities and 
deficiencies, but nevertheless unexpectedly, the EU proposals for the MTR opted for 
a full decoupling of all of the product-based DPs and the introduction of a system of 
Single Farm Payment (SFP) entitlements. The SFP incorporated all of the existing 
product-based DPs and the value of the SFP entitlements would be based on historical 
DPs received by individual farmers within a specified period.  
 
                                                          
4  Dr. W. Dunne was the Teagasc representative on the consultative committee, a summary list of the 
main recommendations is contained in End of Project Report No. 4313 
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The concepts, structure and compliance conditions for the commodity-decoupled SFP 
were almost identical to that developed, published and articulated at conferences and 
seminars under Project 4313. Consequently, Irish cattle farmers were reasonably 
familiar with its structure and its likely impact and consequences. Nevertheless, once 
the EU proposals were published there were many requests for additional 
presentations at farmer and agri-business conferences and for non-peer review 
articles.  
 
While individually5 Irish farmers readily accepted the principle of decoupling, other 
Member States were less enthusiastic about the shift to the SFP system. They were 
either in outright opposition, like France, or negotiated modifications to the 
administrative methodology and/or even delayed its implementation in whole or in 
part.  Much to the surprise of a number of other Member States, Ireland chose after an 
initial lag to agree to implement the entire SFP system and to the time schedule as 
proposed by the EU. This perceived Irish enthusiasm together with the range of 
publications recommending full decoupling which emanated from the previous and 
current research projects resulted in further requests for conference papers from 
various professional international organisations6.  The main focus of these papers was 
to explain the operational logic behind decoupling and the future private and public 
costs and benefits for farmers, resource use, food markets and society in general. 
                                                          
5 In contrast, almost all of the Farm and agri-business organisations in Ireland were initially opposed to 
the EU shift to the SFP.  
 
6 EAAE, EAAP, IRSA 
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3. Results 
 
The concept of extensification was introduced as part of the switch-over to the direct 
payment (DP) system of income support under the MacSharry reforms of the beef 
regime in 1992.  The purpose was to encourage extensive production methods and 
reduce the supply of beef.  
 
Post the BSE crisis in 1996, and particularly under Agenda 2000 the EU income 
support policy for beef farming became progressively more reliant on Direct 
Payments (DPs), see appendix Chart A plus appendix Tables 1 and 2. Also, the added 
emphasis on DPs per se was accompanied by significant restructuring of their 
composition, unit value and the access compliance criteria to encourage farmers to 
undertake more extensive cattle production methods, see appendix Tables 3 to 5.  
 
As the research findings on the extensification system undertaken under this project 
shows, Irish farmers and their cattle production systems were particularly well 
positioned to benefit from such a switch in EU policy emphasis, see appendix Table 2. 
 
The detailed results of the research on extensification undertaken in this project were 
published by Dunne et al in 2000 and 2001 in the form of working papers (working 
papers No. 6 and No.7). The main findings in these working papers and subsequent 
research on related aspects and implications are summarised below.   
 
3.1 Extensification 
The annual revenue from extensification received by Irish cattle farmers in 1999 was 
£80 million, approx. €102 million. This is equivalent to a price increase of about 14 
pence (almost €0.18) per kilo carcass weight when allocated to all Irish beef 
production. When this revenue is allocated to beef produced from the relevant animals 
eligible for extensification as currently administered, namely, males and cull-suckler 
cows, the price equivalent per kilo is of the order of 25 Irish pence, or €0.32.  
 
The potential revenue for Irish cattle farmers from extensification was greatly 
increased under Agenda 2000, see appendix Table 2. This arises because the value of 
the extensification premium itself was increased almost three-fold but the operational 
rules were changed significantly, see appendix Tables 3, 4 and 5. Furthermore, an EU 
wide “administrative cap7” or ceiling was also placed on the budget allocated to 
extensification payments.  
 
All of these changes in the values, structures and administrative procedures affected 
both the ability of individual farmers to access revenue for extensification and the 
overall distribution of the fixed budget between Member States, (Dunne et al, 2000, 
working paper No 6). 
 
 
                                                          
7 Therefore, should Ireland’s competitors collectively become more proficient at capturing EPs in the 
future the EU budget allocation available for extensification could be exceeded. In this eventuality, it is 
probable that there would be a pro rata reduction for everybody in the value of their individual 
premium entitlements, i.e. an EU wide claw-back mechanism similar in structure to that used by 
individual  Member States when National quotas are exceeded for the SBPs.  
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3.2 Operational aspects 
The extensification premium (EP) operates as a “top-up” on the formal applications 
for the suckler cow (SCP) and the special beef (SBP) premiums. The changes in the 
scale of the top-up are summarised in appendix Table 5.   
 
Under the 1992 CAP reform, the EP was payable on farms when the eligible animals 
for which application was made were collectively stocked at less than 1.4 livestock 
units (LU) per forage hectare. In this system specific “hidden animals”, such as 
female cattle etc., could be excluded from the stocking density calculations, see 
appendix Table 4 for details.  Under the Agenda 2000 Agreement significant changes 
in the operation of the system were introduced. Under this agreement all animals, 
whether eligible for the premium or not, must be included in the stocking density 
calculations and heifers, as per the regulations, have the same LU weightings as male 
animals of the same age. Most of the relevant stocking rate compliance criteria 
together with the changes are summarised in appendix Table 4. 
 
Assuming that the national land base available for beef production remains largely 
constant, the inclusion of extra (hidden) animals in the livestock unit calculations 
under Agenda 2000 could have a significant effect on stocking densities and the 
resulting ability of farmers to secure revenue from extensification payments. 
Consequently, the changes in the compliance criteria for individual DPs, and 
especially extensification, impact significantly on the economics and operation of the 
overall Irish cattle production system(s). Also, the stocking density calculations are 
very acute in relation to extensification as the eligibility for these premiums relates to 
the entire eligible livestock herd and not just to premiums on individual animals. 
Consequently, there is an animal number multiplier effect with the possibility of 
either complete eligibility or a zero revenue outcome. Thus necessitating a significant 
risk management input by the individual farmer.  
 
3.3  Extensification options 
In the Fischler proposals for Agenda 2000, published in March 1998, the value of the 
EP was increased almost threefold to 100 euro (IR£79). While the stocking density 
limit was retained at 1.4 LU per forage hectare, the stocking density calculations were 
made more restrictive because all animals had to be accounted for (not just eligible 
animals). This considerable adjustment in the access criteria significantly altered the 
economic benefit of the extensification scheme for a range of farm circumstances and 
had differential impacts for individual Member States. The inter-country impact of 
this proposed change in the stocking density was evaluated and the results were 
published in working paper No. 6.  
 
The Agenda 2000 agreement retained this type of calculation but offered Member 
States a choice of extensification systems with varying rates of premiums.  These are: 
• Option 1: a single payment of €100 (£79) per SBP and SCP collected, 
provided a stocking density limit of 1.4 LU per hectare is met 
      OR 
• Option 2: with two levels of payment depending on the stocking density 
o €80 (£63) at < 1.4 LU per hectare, or 
o €40 (£31.50) within the range of 1.4 and 1.8 LU per hectare. 
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An economic evaluation, published in working paper No.6, showed that: 
• under Option 1, the incentive to extensify production methods is very 
high as the value of the EP top-up has increased to: 
o almost 50 percent of the value of the SCP and SBP per LU for 
suckler cows and bulls respectively, and  
o 67 percent of the value of the SBP per LU for steers  
These percentages are over twice what they were under the 1992 MacSharry 
system, see summary in appendix Table 5. 
  
• under Option 2 where animals on the farm are stocked at: 
o less than 1.4 LU/ha, the incentive is increased significantly as 
the top-up ranges from 36 to 53 percent depending on the type 
of animal, but, 
o in the 1.4 to 1.8 range, the incentive to extensify is relatively 
small at between 18 and 27 percent, and this is even less than 
that under the earlier MacSharry system. 
Compared to the 1992 reform, the incentive to extensify production under 
Agenda 2000 Option 2 is more than doubled at the 1.4 stocking density limit 
but reduced at the 1.8 limit, see summary in appendix Table 5. 
 
3.4 Stocking density changes 
The implications for individual Member States of including heifers in the stocking 
density calculations under Agenda 2000 were evaluated and the detailed results were 
published in working paper No.6.  
 
The main conclusion from an Irish perspective is that the inclusion of the “hidden 
animals” will have a greater negative impact on the access to extensification for all 
the other beef producing Member States, with the exception of Spain, Portugal and 
Greece. The specific estimates indicate if the land base available for cattle production 
remains constant, then the inclusion of the “hidden animals” increases the LUs and 
stocking density by: 
• 44% for the EU-15  
• a lowly 22% for Greece but a high of 61% for Luxembourg, and  
• only by 34% for Ireland. 
 
This is particularly significant in terms of relative potential for access by farmers to 
the revenue from extensification. Also, it could have additional competitiveness 
implications in the future since the total EU budget for extensification per se is fixed. 
 
The capacity of each country to adjust cattle numbers and cohorts to achieve the 
stocking density requirements for extensification under Agenda 2000 was analysed 
and evaluated. The main findings were that the removal of cows is the most effective 
mechanism for reducing animal numbers as the potential progeny are also eliminated.  
 
Estimates show that the removal of a cow effectively eliminates: 
• 1.9 LUs in the EU15, but  
• the values for individual Member States range from a high of 2.32 for 
Ireland to low of 1.37 for Spain.  
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Consequently, the removal of “surplus8 cows” would have a very large impact in 
making ‘room’ to acquire more extensification revenue in Ireland.  
 
To achieve the 1.4 limit by removing cows: 
• Ireland would have to reduce its cow herd by the order of 6 and 10 
percent, but  
• all other Member States would have to remove two to four times more of 
their cow herd  
 
With the removal of this number of cows, many Member States; namely Greece, 
Spain, Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark, would not have sufficient cows, two 
cows per SBP, to produce the required number of male animals to “draw-down” their 
quota of SBP. These countries would therefore be effectively trading off SBPs against 
extensification if they were to try to maintain the MacSharry level of access to EPs. 
The ratio for Ireland would also be restrictive but the normally lower cow 
replacement rate in Ireland would reduce but not eliminate this problem.  
 
The adjustment problems for Ireland would be very small to achieve 1.8 stocking 
density limit. But the 1.8 stocking density limit would draw a very high proportion of 
the animals and the cattle farms into the administrative ambit of the extensification 
system. This would greatly increase the administrative stranglehold on cattle 
production in Ireland and also severely increase the operational constraints for other 
farm enterprises.  
 
The 1.8 limit would cause significant constraints for all other Member States apart 
from Greece, Portugal and Spain. The UK, France and Belgium could exploit the 
option of using the replacement heifers for SCP to minimise, but not eliminate, the 
need to shed dairy cows to maintain access to EPs.  
 
3.5 Economics of extensification 
The economic merits of the two options for extensification were evaluated in relation 
to their ability to generate revenue for Irish farmers9.  
 
The main conclusions arising are: 
• If all the appropriate animals were stocked on farms at less than 1.4 LU, 
Ireland could garner a maximum €326 (IR£257) million in revenue from 
extensification under Option 1, but the maximum that could be collected 
under Option 2 would be €260 (IR£205) million 
 
• Option 1 would give the most revenue if a high percentage of SCP and 
SBP animals were stocked at less than 1.4, but the lower the percentage of 
eligible animals in this category the greater the benefit from Option 2 
 
• Option 2 is best when less than 66 percent of the animals are stocked on 
farms at a stocking rate of under 1.4, but then all eligible animals would 
                                                          
8 “Surplus” to the capacity requirements for fulfilling the National quota entitlements for both milk and 
SCPs. 
 
9 The computational details are available in Dunne et al, working paper No. 6. 
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have to collect extensification at either the 1.4 or 1.8 level of stocking 
density. Otherwise the breakeven percentage would have to increase pro 
rata  
 
• Option 1 is best if more than 66 percent of the animals were stocked on 
farms with a stocking density of less than 1.4 LUs when they claimed their 
SCP or the SBP. In this situation, Option 1 would provide the added 
advantage that the remaining animals, up to 34 per cent, and the farms on 
which they reside, could operate outside the administrative ambit and 
stocking density compliance constraints of the extensification system, (see 
section 3.6 below) 
 
• At the ‘break-even’ point of 66 percent Ireland would collect €216 
(IR£170) million, (see Figure 1). This could be achieved either by 
collecting €100/head on 66 percent of animals under Option 1 or 
alternatively, under Option 2, by a combination of €80/head on 66 percent 
of animals and €40/head on the remaining 34 percent of animals, but 
 
 
Figure 1. Choice of Extensification 
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• the ‘break-even’ point declines rapidly if a significant proportion of the 
animals under Option 2 fail to collect even the €40 extensification 
premium, payable for animals with a stocking density between 1.4 and 1.8. 
The break-even point declines to almost 50 percent once only 80 percent 
or less of the animals collect the €40 extensification premium and the total 
potential revenue declines to €174 (IR£137) million, (see Figure 1). 
 
For a range of practical reasons, there will be some slippage in the ability of Irish 
cattle farmers to collect the maximum number of both SBPs and SCPs together with 
their related extensification premium top-up10. Given the administrative complexity 
of the extensification system itself, with its separate method11 of estimating stockin
densities, some additional slippage would seem inevitable with the EPs.  
g 
                                                          
 
In contrast to Ireland, cattle farmers in other EU countries were shown to be less 
economically dependent on DPs because they obtained higher prices for beef and the 
market–based margin12 contributed a greater proportion of their total margin. 
However, this relative position will be more difficult to maintain under Agenda 2000 
as beef prices decline and the value of the DPs increase. These contrasting revenue 
structures have, of course, significant implications for the competitiveness of Irish 
beef.  
 
3.6 Best extensification option for Ireland 
Two of the main factors in determining the best extensification option for Ireland are: 
• the relative ability of the options to deliver revenue from extensification, 
plus 
• the implications of the chosen options for inter-country competitiveness 
for beef production. 
 
10 Some of the more consequential complications in relation to the drawdown of the revenue from 
SBPs and SCPs  are elucidated in the footnote on appendix Table 2  
 
11 In the calculation of Livestock Units (LUs) to establish the stocking densities for extensification, 
farmers had to choose in advance between two options. The standard method was to take the number 
of animals on the holding at certain “census dates” which would be announced retrospectively by the 
controlling authorities. The alternative, which reduced the administrative burden, was a simplified 
system whereby farmers undertook to maintain the number of animals below the given stocking 
density at all times throughout the year. Neither of these methods should be confused with entirely 
independent method that was used for calculating the stocking density for eligibility for the basic SCPs 
and SCPs. However, it should be noted that the latter method determined the number of eligible 
animals collecting SBPs and SCPs on which the extensification “top-up” payment was administered, 
i.e. one stocking rate system determined the number of animals on which the extensification payment 
was received, or the scale of the extensification payment, but another set of stocking rate calculations 
determined whether or not the farm unit has access to the overall extensification payment. In practice, 
the animals which determined the scale of the payment were not necessarily those that determined the 
access, this was particularly so on farms where there was a considerable turn-over  or “churning” of 
animals due to trading, e.g. farms involved in cattle finishing and especially winter finishing. 
   
12 Margin excluding the revenue from DPs 
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Taking a range of feasible operational adjustments in the Irish cattle sector into 
account, it was concluded that extensification at the 1.4 limit will likely be collected 
on: 
• almost all of the SCPs since the suckler cows are predominantly located on 
the more extensive farms in disadvantaged areas, and  
• most of the 9 month13 SBP for male weanlings from the suckler herd, and 
• some of the 21 month SBP, with the exact proportion dependent on the 
level and structure of the live export trade. 
 
It is probable therefore that farmers’ with suckler-cow herds would benefit most if 
extensification Option 1 were selected. A similar situation will likely prevail on dairy 
farms with relatively low stocking densities. These could trade heifers and young 
male animals strategically to ensure that the stocking densities will be less than 
1.4LU.  
 
The more heavily stocked dairy farms are most likely to have a problem with SBP 
animals stocked at the 1.4 limit. A small but significant realignment of the calf and 
young cattle trading patterns on these farms could achieve the desired result14. These 
intensive farms could also specialise in fattening non-DP animals and in finishing 
beef cattle that have already collected their DPs elsewhere.  This way they would 
avoid the production constraints and the entire bureaucracy of the cattle DP system. 
 
The historical data available15, pre the Agenda 2000 agreement, on the proportion of 
“eligible” animals collecting extensification suggested that Ireland was uniquely 
positioned to benefit from availing of Option 1, which was in fact the original EU 
proposal. This provided the basis of the recommendations by Dunne and O’Connell, 
contained in “strategies and objectives for Agenda 2000 negotiations” presented at 
the beef consultative group on Agenda 2000 that was established by the Minister for 
Agriculture, that Ireland should choose the extensification Option 1. The background 
details of this and other related recommendations are already published End of Project 
Report No 4313. 
 
Subsequent data, published by the EU Court of Auditors16, on extensification 
entitlement claims for the years 2000 and 2001 provide additional evidence that 
Ireland would have benefited most by availing of Option 1. The actual out-turn data 
for a number of years, reproduced in appendix Table 8, show that over 75% of the 
total animals receiving SCPs and SBPs in Ireland also benefited from receiving 
extensification premium top-up. Therefore, the proportion of Irish animals collecting 
extensification has consistently been well in excess of the break-even point of 66 
                                                          
13 Under the earlier MacSharry system, the age limits for the SBPs for eligible steers were one month 
older, at 10 and 22 months respectively. 
 
14 These intensive dairy farms would indirectly benefit from the extensification revenue because a 
portion of the premiums would be capitalised into the market value of the additional young  (SBP and 
EP) eligible animals that may now be sold.  
 
15 Dunne, W. Revenue from direct payments in beef production, pages 149-150, In proceedings 
Agricultural Research Forum, UCD, April 1997 
 
16 Official Journal C290, Vol 45, pp 1-22, 2002 
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percent discussed in section 3.5 above. It is highly probable that the break-even point 
would also be exceeded under the Agenda 2000 agreement despite the shift to more 
stringent stocking density criteria.   
 
Nonetheless, following the Agenda 2000 agreement, the Irish authorities chose to 
implement extensification Option 2, presumably to achieve a greater dispersal among 
farmers of the financial and farm income benefits of a reduced potential pool of 
extensification revenue17.  
 
The financial and farm income benefits of this wider dispersal of extensification 
revenue may be more apparent than real. As noted earlier, the extensification 
premium was effectively administered as a “top-up” payment on animals that had 
already collected either an SBP or an SCP on the same farm. Within any year, the 
“drawdown” of an SCP was largely tied to a specific farm through the requirement for 
SCP quota rights, which were only partly tradable. However, no such mobility 
constraints existed for the SBPs. This mobility had, of course, consequential 
implications for the final farm destination of the extensification payment which could 
therefore significantly mitigate administrative policy efforts at targeting the dispersal 
of extensification revenue towards specific farm types. 
 
As already demonstrated, there are a number of serious inherent deficiencies within 
the administrative structure of the animal-based DP system and these can result in a 
substantial indirect redistribution of much of their financial benefits. For example,  
“To obtain the payment, the farmer must have eligible land and/or eligible 
animals. Since the supply of both is finite or controlled, part of the value of the 
DP goes to the suppliers of the eligible animals and land. The flow of DPs to 
various groups of cattle farmers creates  a counter-flow of DP-induced costs, 
which increase along the beef production chain. The net effect is that farms 
involved in finishing cattle are much more dependent on DPs than those in the 
breeding stages. Farmers finishing cattle may appear to collect their share of 
DPs, but much of the value of the DP is already built into the price of the 
animal being bought-in”,18.  
                                                          
17 According to the Court of Auditors report paragraph 16 
 “---- . Six Member States (Germany, Greece, Spain, Austria, Portugal and 
Sweden) opted to apply only one threshold, so as to pay a higher EPS 
(Extensification Payment Scheme) subsidy to those producers that have a 
lower SD (Stocking Density). The other Member States opted for a two-tier 
system with lower EPS payments. The authorities in Spain and Austria 
informed the Court that they chose only one SD threshold in order to allow 
producers to benefit from a higher additional payment, most beef producers in 
these countries would have no problems in meeting the lower SD. The 
authorities in France, Ireland and the United Kingdom informed the Court 
that they chose the two-tier system because it would allow producers to reduce 
their production over a number of years and/or because it allows more 
producers to benefit”.  
 
18 Dunne, W. (1998) Direct payments: case for change. Teagasc, Todays Farm July/August, 1998, pp 
36-37. 
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Since the administration of the extensification premium was essentially 
piggybacked on the SBP and SCP, all of these structural weaknesses would 
equally apply to the dispersal of its revenue and the counter-flow of related 
costs. Furthermore, enhancing access to extensification revenue for the more 
intensively stocked farms would encourage these farms to retain as many 
animals as possible to collect both the SBP and the EP, albeit at the lower 
level of €40 per animal. This, in-turn would further restrict the supply of 
eligible animals to other farms and thereby accentuate the overall premium 
capitalisation process together with its implications for the dispersal of 
revenue benefits and counter-flow costs. 
 
Under Agenda 2000, the administrative stranglehold of the DPs in general and their 
related cost burden on cattle production in Ireland was greatly increased, even if 
extensification Option 1 was chosen, see section 3.4 above. The additional 
bureaucratisation arising from the choice of extensification Option 2 severely added 
to the operational husbandry constraints within cattle farms, intensified the DP 
capitalisation process per se and had knock-on implications for other farm enterprises, 
see section 3.8, plus sections 3.10 through to 3.13 below. All of this served to further 
undermine the possibilities for any targeted revenue redistribution objectives among 
farmers that may arise through the choice of extensification Option 2. 
 
3.7 Maximising revenue 
When all these factors are considered, it is probable that Ireland would benefit most 
from the Option 1 extensification system. Option 1 would: 
• yield the highest revenue for the country 
• target a higher portion of the revenue towards the supply of cattle from the 
suckler herd which are of a higher quality relative to cattle from the dairy 
herd 
• target more of the revenue towards the poorer regions of the country where 
extensive production systems are already used 
• release the larger dairy farms and market oriented cattle fattening farms 
from the stocking density  requirement  and the administrative bureaucracy 
associated with the DPs and extensification 
• best facilitate the production of quality finished animals for the higher 
priced beef markets within the EU. 
 
Even with Option 2, an increasing number of Irish cattle farmers will aim for the 1.4 
limit to get the higher of the two extensification premiums available, i.e. €80 rather 
than €40 per eligible animal. The incentive to do this will increase as: 
• calves become scarce and expensive as cow numbers decline in response 
to milk and suckler cow quota limits (see End of Project Report No. 4313) 
• the market price of beef declines once the lower Agenda 2000 price 
supports are implemented  
• more farmers opt to join REPS19, with its associated more stringent 
nutrient and stocking density compliance criteria 
• more farmers secure off-farm employment which will lead to less labour 
intensive and operationally simpler cattle production systems20. 
                                                          
19 Rural Environment Protection Scheme, Ireland’s agri-environment scheme. 
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3.8 Feed resource cost implications 
For Irish cattle farmers operating under Agenda 2000, the primary management 
decision incentives within their remit is the ability to gain access to extensification 
payments through adjusting the stocking density of the farm as a functioning unit. As 
noted above, farm level stocking densities could be manipulated by adjusting animal 
numbers and/or animal types through strategic sales21 and purchases at critical time 
periods throughout the year. Alternatively, stocking rates could be manipulated by 
adjusting the land base farmed by either renting-in additional land or even renting-out 
land that is surplus to the requirements of the stocking rate target.  
 
The financial gains and losses arising from incremental adjustments to stocking 
densities by the various alternative methodologies over the relevant range of stocking 
rates for the DP system (under 1.4 to over 2.0 LU/ha) were modelled in detail using 
spreadsheets.  The results, published in working paper No. 7, showed that many 
farmers could afford to pay considerably in excess of the prevailing annual market 
rents (“con-acre” rates) for extra land in order to achieve small, but economically very 
significant, stocking rate adjustments and thereby to gain access to extensification 
payments for the entire farm.  
 
Comparable marginal financial and farm income incentives existed in relation to the 
strategic purchases and/or sales of a range of animal types22. These financial 
incentives often exceed by multiples the likely market-based margin the farmer could 
derive from retaining specific animals. In certain respects farmers were being induced 
into managing an animal trading portfolio as an alternative to beef production per se. 
 
In general, the greatest incentive for the individual farmer is to expand their overall 
land base by renting-in more land as this essentially expands the entire farm business. 
Since the available land pool for renting is largely finite, this would not be feasible for 
farmers collectively as land rents will increase accordingly. Either way, the extra land 
required per animal to provide additional access to the extensification payments has 
assumed a significant positive rental value for many cattle farmers. Consequently the 
net farm average rent accruing for land, the renting-in cost less the DP access benefit, 
could be modest.  
 
But the extra land per animal also added to the internal feed (forage) resources of the 
farm unit. The positive rent arising from the extra (rented-in) land, would in-turn 
reduce the economic cost of forage, especially internally produced silage23. For most 
cattle production systems availing of extensification, managing surplus grass would 
                                                                                                                                                                      
20 For further elaboration, see subsequent paper by Dunne, W. (2006) Labour market developments 
and a future in farming. Paper presented at Special Training Conference for Master Farmers, Hotel 
Minella, Clonmel, Co. Tipperary October 31, 2006.  
 
21 Subject to the animal retention requirement period for the individual DPs. 
 
22 Specific animals could have a LU coefficient of zero, 0.6 or 1.0 depending on age, see appendix 
Table 4. For each of these there was essentially a trade-off between its market-based margin, premium 
status, and the monetary value of any associated premiums.  
  
23 For further details see Dunne 2002abc, and 2005a. 
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be problematic especially on farms with high quality land. Consequently, this surplus 
feed would have to be removed for grassland management reasons, most likely in the 
form of silage24, and almost irrespective of the cost of its off-take. In such situations, 
there would be very limited technical or economic reasons for cattle farmers to 
“import” onto the farm externally purchased feeds in the form of concentrates25 
almost irrespective of price26. 
 
For Irish cattle farmers at least, it was concluded that the growing institutional 
complexities of the animal-based DP system, and especially the extensification 
element of it, was seriously distorting the inherent economics and husbandry of cattle 
farming and that this income support system was becoming progressively more 
unsustainable. Thus providing further evidence on the desirability and the need to 
develop more suitable alternative DP income support systems such as those outlined 
by Dunne 1996f, 1997b and further elaborated on by Dunne and O’Connell 1998. 
This theme is addressed in greater detail later, see section 3.13 and thereafter.  
 
3.9 Inter-country competitiveness 
Most Member States apart from Ireland already have limited access to EPs, appendix 
Table 6. Based on the information in section 3.4 above, extending the stocking 
density to 1.8 would be of much greater advantage to them than it would for Ireland.  
 
Since Ireland is already much closer to its maximum capacity to avail of 
extensification, any relaxing of the stocking density requirements would be more 
beneficial to competitors which have much higher stocking densities. Ireland would 
therefore be compromising part of its competitiveness in cattle production by 
allowing a significant number of the more intensive non-Irish producers to receive 
higher margins with its related consequences for future beef supplies and prices. Also, 
as demonstrated previously in End of Project Report 4313, any increase in beef 
supplies in an already oversupplied EU beef market has a more pronounced negative 
effect on beef prices and the margins derived from cattle farming in Ireland. 
 
                                                          
24 In farm practice this generally took the form of strategic and periodic off-takes of baled silage 
throughout the growing season. The surplus silage bales could subsequently be sold to other farmers 
through inter-farm trading, or allocated to another grass or silage based enterprise, like dairying, where 
these enterprises co-exist with cattle farming. In the latter, the surplus grass or silage could be 
integrated into the overall feeding system for non-cattle enterprise. This essentially is the equivalent to 
a cross-enterprise feed subsidisation with the costs attributed to the cattle and the benefit accruing to 
the dairying. 
 
25 In some situations, such as finishing cattle for specific markets, the use of such higher energy feeds 
may be technically necessary and/or more efficient in achieving wider logistical and/or management 
objectives.   
 
26 Apart from situations where silage or grass is produced as an independent cash crop for direct sale, 
the cost of producing silage or grass per se is of academic interest because in most farm situations, 
these are intermediate products within a livestock farming system. As noted by Dunne,  “estimating the 
cost of producing silage or grass that include a land charge is dependent on the economic 
circumstances in which the silage or grass is both produced and used. …. In cattle farming within the 
EU, land performs a dual function in that it supplies fodder and provides access to DPs via stocking 
density compliance criteria.”  The net outcome is largely a reflection of the trade-off between silage 
yields, direct costs, animal types, animal margins, DPs and land rental charges.  For further information 
on the competitiveness of silage, see Dunne 2002abc and 2005a and/or End of Project Report No.4313. 
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All the indications are that Ireland may be the only member state in the EU that would 
benefit from using Option 1 with its single EP and a stocking density limit of 1.4. But, 
under the final Agenda 2000 agreement, Option 2 became available and it will allow 
Ireland’s competitors to gain further access to EPs. In addition, this extra access, 
albeit to the lower valued EPs, will be of increasing significance in these Member 
States as the price of beef declines as envisaged under Agenda 2000.  
 
Should Ireland’s competitors become even more successful in capturing EPs, there is 
also the additional complication of the “administrative cap” on the overall EU budget 
available for extensification. If in the future, the EU extensification budget is 
exceeded it is probable that the value of the individual EPs will be scaled back pro 
rata. This would certainly not suit Ireland, as it would effectively mean a scaling back 
of the value of individual EPs in Ireland to finance the EPs for competitors in other 
countries.  
 
When a choice became available under the Agenda 2000 agreement the authorities in 
Ireland27 chose to implement Option 2, despite its economic disadvantages, This 
extensification option had multiple revenue and income distribution implications 
together with competitiveness consequences for Irish cattle farming in both the 
immediate years and the longer term.  
 
As already noted elsewhere, there are both direct and indirect financial benefits 
arising for cattle farmers from the animal-based DP system in the short-term. The 
individual farmer who claims and receives the actual DPs, basic SBP and SCP plus 
the appropriate extensification top-up, benefits directly. But indirect revenue and 
income benefits also arise from the, well recognised and documented, capitalisation of 
a portion of the value of these DPs into cattle cohort prices together with the related 
counter-flow of costs along the production chain, see section 3.6 above. 
 
When the capitalisation process itself is combined with the relatively high level of 
inter-farm trading of animals in Ireland the ultimate destination of the net financial 
benefits of the DPs become rather diffuse. Consequently, an individual cattle farmer 
does not necessarily have to collect the animal-based extensification premiums to 
substantially benefit financially from the system per se. Therefore, unlike in other 
Member States, the high level of inter-farm trading would result in a more ubiquitous 
distribution of the benefits of the revenue from DPs through cattle prices in Ireland. 
This outcome would largely arise almost irrespective of the extensification option 
chosen but, of course, there would be less extensification revenue available for 
disbursement under Option 2. 
 
The perceptible financial benefit is completely transparent for the farmer who actually 
receives the DP per se, hence the apparent policy attraction of availing of Option 2. In 
contrast, it is much more difficult to precisely predict both the scale and the ultimate 
                                                          
 
27 Following the Agenda 2000 Agreement, the Irish authorities chose to implement Option 2, 
presumably because as the Court of Auditors report states “it allows more producers to benefit”. This 
suggests an implicit policy choice of trading away of the possibilities for obtaining extra EU revenue 
from EPs against a more ubiquitous distribution among Irish cattle farmers of the lower overall 
financial pool.   
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destination of the redistribution of the indirect benefits due to the relatively high level 
of inter-farm trading and the pervasive nature of cattle farming in Ireland.  
 
In general, the main indirect beneficiaries of the capitalisation process are the farmers 
who breed and/or rear young animals, i.e. primarily farmers with dairy-cow and/or 
suckler-cow based cattle enterprises. This occurs at the expense of those farmers who 
may actually collect the animal-based DPs but are at the fattening or finishing stages 
of the cattle production chain. Therefore, farmers involved in the breeding and rearing 
segment benefit both directly and indirectly from the animal-based DP system.  
 
The choice extensification Option 2 provided further scope for extra direct benefits 
for the more intensively stocked farms, most of whom derive their primary farm 
income from dairying, see section 3.6 above. This additional gain is at the expense of 
the lowly stocked, economically vulnerable suckler-cow farms with very limited 
production alternatives, and which are mainly located in disadvantaged areas and for 
which the extensification system was originally designed. Furthermore, these farms 
are the major suppliers of high quality young beef animals (weanlings) for both 
domestic cattle fattening farms and for the live export trade to fattening units in 
Continental Europe. 
 
In the longer term, the authority’s choice of extensification Option 2 would again 
prove particularly advantageous for the more intensive cattle farmers in Ireland. 
When the decoupling of the animal-based DPs was implemented in 2005, the value of 
the future annual Single Farm Payment (SFP) entitlements were based on the actual 
number and value of animal-based premiums secured in the relevant historical 
reference period.  
 
Therefore, even in the post decoupling era, the more intensively stocked farms 
continue to benefit from the choice of Options 2. In contrast, decoupling eliminated 
the financial benefits for those farmers relying on the indirect capitalised value of the 
animal-based DPs. Therefore, the choice of extensification Option 2 in effect reduced 
the potential value of SFP entitlements on farms with suckler cows and further 
undermined the future export competitiveness of beef derived from the suckler-cow 
herd in Ireland. These suckler-cow farms in Ireland could, however, receive some 
financial and competitiveness redress in the future in the event of a shift towards a flat 
area SFP system28.   
 
3.10 Added complexities 
A major negative feature of Option 2 is its ability to suck-into its administrative ambit 
almost all the farms with stocking densities in the 1.6 to 2.0 range but yet deliver 
relatively small overall revenue benefits from extensification. Consequently, the 
compliance criteria for extensification under Option 2 would have a significant 
administrative burden and added compliance cost effect on almost the entire Irish 
cattle herd and for land use for other enterprises such as dairying, cereals and sheep.  
 
                                                          
28 Dunne, W., and Shanahan, U.  A flat area-based Single Farm Payment system.  p158, in summary of 
papers presented at the Agricultural Research Forum 2008.  
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On the other hand as outlined in the Court of Auditors report29, by selecting Option 2 
it may simply be considered desirable that a very high proportion of the eligible 
animals in the EU and in Ireland should receive an extensification premium. If this 
were the objective for Ireland, it would have been preferable and operationally 
simpler if the related €40 (£31.5) extensification premium was administered by 
increasing the value of the basic SCPs and SBPs by the equivalent amount. This 
would have avoided the administratively invasive nature of the 1.8 limit as outlined 
above. But then perhaps, the payment could not be classified as an incentive to 
extensify production.  
 
The economics of extensification are increasingly dependent on the relative scarcity 
of eligible animals and land. As the price of beef declines and the value of the DPs 
increase, more of the value of the DPs becomes capitalised into the factors specified 
in the compliance criteria, namely eligible animals and land. This progressively 
pushes out the non-eligible or non-DP animals (cows surplus to quotas, heifers, male 
animals that have already collected their SBPs, lambs over 6 months), and low-DP 
animals (non-replacement beef heifers). Possible mitigation measures were outlined in 
the recommendations by Dunne and O’Connell (End of Project Report No. 4313) to 
the Beef Consultative Group in relation to DPs and stocking densities for non-DP and 
low-value DP animals. 
 
In the future, the number of eligible animals will decline as the market-based margin 
shrinks, and perhaps may even become negative. This may occur because of a 
combination of both falling beef prices and rising costs. The rise in costs is in turn 
driven by the capitalisation process and accentuated by it. Therefore, trying to 
maintain farm incomes by increasing the value of the EPs, which are also tied to the 
shrinking-pool of eligible animals further increases this capitalisation process on the 
animals. These are the very same weaknesses in the existing EU policy system first 
identified by Dunne in 1996f, and provided the basis for the development of an 
alternative non animal-based (decoupled) income support mechanism as outlined by 
Dunne and O’Connell 1998, 1999, 2000cd and 2002a. 
 
3. 11 Overall implications 
The Agenda 2000 agreement is largely an extension of the MacSharry reforms made 
in 1992. The main differences being that the extensefication system under Agenda 
2000 assumed an added significance both in terms of: 
• the relative increase in the value of the payments 
• the complexity of the compliance criteria for these payments 
• the inter-country competitiveness dimension. 
 
It is generally accepted that cattle farmers’ incomes in Ireland have benefited greatly 
from the CAP reform in 1992 and likewise from the more recent Agenda 2000 
agreement30. Yet, the disillusionment about the future for Irish cattle farming 
                                                          
29 CEC - Court of Auditors report (2002) (OJ C290, Vol 45, pp 1-22, 2002) 
 
30 O’Connell et al 1999d working paper No.4., Dunne et al 1999 working paper No. 5, and Dunne in 
annual situation and outlook report for cattle, various issues.  
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continued, even post the Agenda 2000 agreement. As the following sections 
demonstrate, much of this discontent was a consequence of the ever increasing 
official administrative intrusion into farming activities and the related administrative 
burden being placed on individual farmers operating within this system.  
 
3. 12 Factors shaping Irish agriculture 
Most of this disillusionment is related to the operational aspects and the compliance 
criteria of the DP income support system31. The main benefits and costs associated 
with the existing DP system as it operates for cattle farming in Ireland were 
summarised by Dunne and O’Connell, (2000d) as follows:  
 
“For cattle farmers these payments were and are based on the possession of 
certain types of animals which have to be “farmed” within specified stocking 
density limits. But, the fundamental issue is that cattle production per se has 
become uneconomic and is increasingly being wedged in a cost-price 
squeeze”.   
 
The evidence to support this viewpoint, reproduced in Figures 2 and 3, was derived 
from the Teagasc, National Farm Survey. As Figure 2 shows, the gross margin32 from 
the entire “Irish” cattle enterprise was largely maintained until 1998 but the 
composition of that margin was becoming increasingly dependent on direct payments 
(DPs).  The market based gross margin (MBGM), which is the value of the carcass 
less the direct costs, decreased rapidly after 1995 once the price of beef declined. By 
the end of the decade, the MBGM was small and still declining.  
 
Figure 3 shows that the deteriorating situation becomes even more acute when the 
market based net margin (MBNM), which is the value of the carcass less the total cost 
of production, is examined. The MBNM was declining but still positive until 1996 
when it became negative. It became increasingly negative in 1998 and 1999.  It may 
even be positive in 2000 due to an increase in cattle prices. But it will resume its 
negative trend as the Agenda 2000 agreement is phased in and the value of the DPs 
increase and beef prices decline and general costs increase, Dunne and O’Connell, 
2000d. 
 
The graphics33 in  Figures 2 and 3 clearly show that even pre the Agenda 2000 
agreement, Irish cattle collectively “die in debt” and farmers have been "paying to get 
the cheque in the post" since 1996.  
                                                          
31 The following sections are heavily informed by a paper by Dunne and O’Connell 2000d presented at  
the Teagasc, Agri-Food Economics conference in 2000, and related publications in the early years of 
the new millennium. 
 
32 The convention in margin analysis as outlined by Dunne and Shanahan 1999ab is that  “ … if the net 
margin is positive the business is profitable but if the gross margin is negative the business is 
unprofitable. If the net margin is negative but the gross margin is positive then there is a contribution 
to overheads and the business will continue until profitability improves or a major asset has to be 
replaced. The increasing importance of direct payments has reduced the value of this type of analysis 
for predicting the likely response by farmers to changing economic circumstances. To overcome these 
limitations two further margins were computed which excluded the value of the direct payments from 
both the gross and net margins to provide a market based gross margin (MBGM) and a market based 
net margin (MBNM).” 
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Subsequent research results, also derived from the NFS, verified this increasing 
reliance of cattle margins on the value of the DPs under the Agenda 2000 agreement, 
see Figures 4, 5 and 6.  Mainly as a consequence of an increase in beef prices, the 
overall gross margin for cattle increased in 2000 and a small upward trend continued 
thereafter, Figure 434.  
 
However, the percentage of this gross margin that was being obtained from the 
market, the MBGM, resumed its downward trend until 2004, Figure 5. Furthermore, 
the MBGM for cattle finishing systems35 declined rapidly after 1999 and effectively 
disappeared36 for some systems in 2003 and 2004, Figure 6.  
 
In the absence of the animal-based DPs, these farms would be considered unprofitable 
and therefore would cease production forthwith. The persistence of such cattle 
production systems provides additional evidence to support the earlier observation of 
an increasing proportion of the value of the animal-based DPs being capitalised into 
young animal prices. Thereby, seriously distorting the inherent economics of cattle 
farming by: 
• the preservation and maintenance of a better MBGM for cattle rearing 
systems, such as Single Suckling (SS) and Rearing on Dairy Farms (RDF) in 
Figure 6, via higher animal sales prices, but 
  
• resulting in an additional cost for the young animals being purchased by the 
farmers involved in cattle finishing systems, such as Weanling to Store/Finish 
(WSF) and Stores to Stores/Finish (SSF) in Figure 6, with the consequence of  
 
• persistent negative MBGM for the finishing systems, but these farmers 
 
• must remain in production in order to gain access to the animal-based DPs 
which constitutes both their “enterprise” margin and income. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
33 Graphics derived from Dunne, Teagasc, situation and outlook (various years). 
 
34 In contrast to Figures 2 and 3, these data in Figure 4 are expressed in €/ha, the appropriate 
conversions are €1= IR£ 0.787564 and a hectare is equivalent to 2.471 acres. 
 
35 The selected cattle systems which were derived from the Teagasc, National Farm Survey and 
presented in Figure 6 are: SS = Single Suckling, RDF = Rearing on Dairy Farms, WSF = Weanling to 
Store/Finish, SSF = Store to Store/Finish. 
 
36 These are average values for the selected cattle production systems, consequently there is a high 
probability that even when the average value is small there will be a substantial number of the farms 
with negative margins.  
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Figure 2: Gross margins in cattle farming
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Figure 4: Gross margin - All cattle systems
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Source: Dunne, The cattle enterprise. In Situation and Outlook (various issues) 
Figure 5: Gross margin derived from market 
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In general under the various CAP reforms, production costs for the individual cattle 
farmer have been increasing due to the additive impact of: 
• the quota restrictions (milk and suckler-cows) on the supply of calves which 
results in high calf prices, plus 
• the added cost complication for calf prices arising from the capitalisation of a 
portion of the values of the animal-based DPs  
• the ever increasing land base needed to achieve the stocking density limits 
required to collect the direct payments which have in effect become the only 
margin and/or income (Figures 2, 3 and 6) 
• the ever increasing land base needed to collect the higher value extensification 
premium, thereby further increasing marginal land rents, and 
• the universal increases in costs arising from subsequent inflation. 
 
Overall, such a DP based income support system provides very limited scope for the 
individual farmer37 to manage costs and/or adjust production methods to reflect the 
final market value of the beef carcass.   
 
 
                                                          
37 For most Irish cattle farmers almost all of their production decisions were primarily driven by the 
compliance and administrative requirements of the direct payment system. Therefore, throughout this 
period there was little scope or financial incentive for the farmers themselves to avail of alternative 
cattle production enhancing technologies that would increase technical efficiency and productivity. 
Perhaps such an outcome is not so bewildering because a supply control component was an integral 
part of the design of the DP system itself. The main supply control aspects were: National and/or 
specific farm quotas for individual DPs and their related stocking density access compliance criteria 
plus the supply reduction impact of declining support prices for the beef itself. 
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The end result is that: 
• there is no market return from producing the beef animal per se 
• farmers have less and less control of the margins they can obtain from their 
animals  
• the overall revenue in the sector is fixed and a declining portion of it is derived 
from the market as the value of the carcass declines, but  
• costs are increasing and these are mainly driven by the compliance criteria for 
the direct payments, more expensive calves and land. 
 
Consequently, average incomes within the aggregate cattle sector cannot increase 
unless the numbers of cattle farmers decline. But cattle farmers, because of their 
circumstances, have been largely ineligible for the Farm Retirement Scheme (FRS38).  
This is still the situation despite some recent modifications to the criteria for the Farm 
Retirement Scheme.   
 
The end result is the farmer has to stay in beef production although there is no profit 
in cattle production per se. But the farmer needs the cattle39 to get access to the 
direct payments that are in fact the income.   
 
A similar economic situation exists for most cereal farmers who wish to scale-up their 
activities to maintain or increase their income. The margin and almost all of the 
income is in the direct payment but access to extra scarce and therefore expensive 
“eligible land” is required to draw down more direct payments.  
 
As a consequence, on many Irish farms, even where land is suitable for a range of 
enterprises, the optimum enterprise mix is becoming an issue of establishing the best 
balance between: 
• the increasing value of the DPs for the individual enterprises, and  
• the costs related to the compliance criteria for the DPs for the 
individual enterprises.  
 
                                                          
38 An eligibility requirement for FRS was the farmer must be replaced by a young trained farmer 
operating on an extended the land base. 
 
39 Within a decade, the economic imperative for Irish cattle farmers arising from the various EU policy 
developments was radically transformed. Until the mid 1990’s  EU policy and economic signals 
encouraged farmers to produce very heavy carcasses or “elephants of cattle” that could be sold at a 
guaranteed price into intervention and this provided for the possibility to dispersal the high cost of a 
restricted supply calves over more kilos of beef, Keane and Dunne, W. (1993), and Dunne 1998a. 
Subsequently, the component elements of the various CAP reforms, mainly the DP aspects, transposed 
the economic incentive for farmers to sequentially consider the rather expensive calf as a “premium 
harvester”, an “environmental manager” and ultimately “the stamp on the envelope” to deliver the DPs 
with guaranteed increasing value, Dunne 1998a. Should this transposition persist it could have 
substantial long term implications for both type of calf being produced and the strength of the market 
interface between beef producers and consumers within the EU.  By the end of decade, the main 
financial incentive for Irish cattle farmers was to secure a stable supply of healthy and low 
maintenance cost calves, preferably male, to ensure the maximum capture of the appropriate DPs 
available. Since the economics of producing quality finished cattle per se was progressively being 
marginalised, carcass weights and finish were secondary considerations while the links and market 
signals between producers and beef consumers were becoming increasingly tenuous.  
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For farmers, most of the financial rewards are derived from “playing by the rules of 
the DP system” rather than from practising good animal and grassland husbandry.  
 
In Ireland40, when this is combined with the traditional pattern of land inheritance and 
the increased availability of off-farm employment there will be very limited 
restructuring of farms, Dunne 2000d, Dunne 2006a. This almost fossilisation of farm 
structures for cattle and cereals will increase unit costs over a number of years and 
will have a similar knock-on impact on other farm enterprises.   
 
3.13 Adjustments necessary 
Under Agenda 2000, the income for cattle and cereal farmers continued to hinge on 
very detailed administrative calculations for individual animals and hectares. Cattle 
farming is increasingly entering an administrative straightjacket with high costs at 
both farm level and nationally.  The nature and structure of both the MacSharry and 
the Agenda 2000 CAP reforms were such that cattle farmers and farming methods 
were now severely constrained by what could be described as  
“a mixture of administrative, economic and bureaucratic asphyxiation”, 
Dunne 2000a. 
And, with cattle farming being so pervasive in Ireland, this affects most farmers and 
other farm enterprises where they must co-exist.  
 
The wide-ranging structural weaknesses in the animal-based DP system were 
identified following the BSE crisis in 1996, and more suitable alternative EU farm 
income support systems were proposed, developed and elaborated by, Dunne 1996f 
and 1997b, Dunne and O’Connell 1998, 1999, 2000cd and 2002a.  
 
As stated by Dunne and O’Connell 1998, page 5: 
“the current method of administering DPs, through the eligible animal system, 
does appear to be an extraordinarily complex and expensive method to arrive 
at an area payment irrespective of the faults of an area based payment.”   
 
The research summarised in this report confirm the earlier observation by Dunne and 
O’Connell 2000d, page 29:  
“The major weakness in the existing DP system is in relation to the inequitable 
distribution of the payments themselves and the leakage of much of their value 
into input costs. The main effects are:  
• the poor targeting of the payments themselves  
• administrative complexities of the payment system  
• the knock-on effects of the payment system in relation to: 
• beef production costs and 
• the lack of reward for good animal husbandry practices and for 
producing quality beef 
• the lack of  any clear benefit to either society and/or the 
taxpayer from this rather large expenditure.” 
 
The focus of much of the research effort under this and the related earlier project 
(4313)  was to establish how these structural weaknesses identified could be rectified 
by de-coupling the DPs from eligible animals and by using other methods with more 
                                                          
40 Pre decoupling of the DPs in 2005 
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suitable compliance criteria to distribute the DPs to farmers. The outcome over a 
number of years of the research was the development and publication41 of a detailed 
methodological framework for all land using enterprises within the EU.  
 
Agreement on such major structural shifts and policy reforms are by their nature slow 
and difficult to achieve at EU level. Consequently, there was a limited expectation 
that moves in this direction may be possible in the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the 
Agenda 2000 reforms due in 2002/03. However, based on the research arising from 
this project, decoupling of the animal based DPs appeared inevitable within a few 
years.  
 
In the absence of full decoupling, an interim partial solution which could have been 
implemented immediately in Ireland was possible, see sections 3.5 to 3.9 above. The 
Irish authorities, by exercising a preference in favour of the single payment 
extensification option available under the Agenda 2000 agreement, could provide for: 
• all eligible animals on farms stocked at 1.4 LU/ha or lower to obtain an EP of 
€100 (or IR£79) each, while 
• all other farmers and their related land area, steers, heifers, cows and cereal 
area could be farmed outside the stocking density constraints of the 
extensification system, and  
• the revenue available from extensification in Ireland to be maximised. 
 
However, as discussed in section 3.6 above, the Irish authorities chose to implement 
extensification Option 2 presumably to achieve a greater dispersal among farmers of 
the financial payment and farm income benefits of a reduced potential pool of 
extensification revenue.  
 
Against this policy implementation background, fully rectifying the structural 
weaknesses of the existing DP system through decoupling was likely to be tedious. 
Nevertheless, even then, decoupling was probably inevitable as the EU policy 
environment was constantly adjusting in response to market and farm income 
challenges but the direction of this change had begun to crystallise at institutional 
level within the EU. 
 
3.14 The Drivers of Change 
Almost a precondition for the successful development and implementation of any 
future alternative DP systems within the EU is that these must be advanced within a 
policy context likely to: 
• prevail internally within the EU, and against  
• the external trade (WTO) background in which such alternative payments 
systems must function.  
This approach was used in developing the multi-commodity framework published by 
Dunne 1996f and 1997b, Dunne and O’Connell 1998, 1999, 2000abcd and 2002ab. 
The following is a brief outline of the policy conditions considered likely to prevail 
for the then immediate future. 
 
                                                          
41 See Dunne and O’Connell 1998, 1999, 2000abcd, 2002ab, 2003ab, and 2004a plus End of Project 
Report 4313. 
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Over the next decade there will be continued pressure on the EU through the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) for freer trade in agricultural products. While it is unlikely 
that EU farm product prices will be reduced to world levels, except for cereals, the 
move in this direction will continue.  
 
Under the prevailing WTO agreement, other trading countries have accepted that 
there is an element of supply control attached to the DP system in the EU. But with 
the value of the DPs increasing, this acceptance may not be sufficient justification for 
their continued existence in the next WTO agreement.  It is, therefore, likely that the 
EU will have to develop a new role for the DPs if they are to survive the next round of 
WTO negotiations which were due for completion about 2003.   
 
As CAP reform progressively shifts from product prices towards DPs, the financial 
burden for the CAP within the EU switches from consumers to taxpayers. But, 
already a ceiling exists on the overall size of the EU farm budget. This could become 
a constraint in the future as the shift to the more budget demanding DPs continues.  
 
The budgetary situation is further compounded by the costs of enlargement to include 
a number of accession countries from Central and Eastern Europe. The original EU 
plan was that it would not be necessary to extend the DP system to these new 
countries since they did not have farm product price reductions and, therefore, would 
not require the DPs as compensation. However, this EU stance has weakened 
somewhat as the negotiations have progressed.  
 
Expanding the farm budget to accommodate the added financial burden for extra DPs 
could become progressively more difficult to justify in the future unless the purpose 
of the DPs change. As the product price reductions become more distant in time, the 
idea of paying the DPs as compensation for these historical support price adjustments 
becomes less sustainable.  
 
Probably in anticipation of these internal and external pressures, the EU had already 
begun to redefine the role of agriculture in the Union42.  These multi-functional43 
aspects of the CAP were not explicitly incorporated in the final Agenda 2000 
agreement, but they will likely shape the role of EU farming in the future.  
 
Already under Agenda 2000, the existing “headage” payments have been decoupled 
from animals, restructured as area-based payments and linked to land management to 
prevent environmental degradation. Also, a number of these issues are now being 
included either directly, like the environmental compliance criteria for the general 
DPs, or indirectly through the requirement of cross-compliance for various EU farm 
schemes. 
 
The new EU vision of the multifunctional aspects of the CAP raises very fundamental 
issues in relation to the nature and purpose of farming in the EU of the future, 
                                                          
42 CEC  (1997) Agenda 2000, for a stronger and wider Union, Com (97) 200 final.  
 
43 The Agenda 2000 proposals outlined a number of non-price issues in relation to competitiveness, the 
multi-functional nature of EU agriculture and the CAP generally, for summary see Dunne and 
O’Connell 2000d and End of Project Report No. 4313. 
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together with the methods and financial incentives that might be used to deliver this. 
A recasting of the DPs as payments for the provision of public goods is likely to be a 
major feature of future EU policy for farming. 
 
The unrelenting drive to improve technical and economic efficiency in livestock 
farming has a number of indirect costs. The main ones are the negative impacts on the 
environment, animal welfare, food safety and even ethical issues. These, individually 
and collectively, are normally referred to as “public costs” since they do not directly 
affect the farmer and the economic sustainability of the enterprises per se.  But, these 
costs accrue to society as a whole and arise from the deterioration or even loss of the 
“public value” placed on these goods by society as a whole. The new EU vision of the 
multifunctional aspects of the CAP is an attempt to include these public good values 
as part of the cost for future agricultural production systems in the EU. 
 
A method by which public goods could be incorporated into a multi-commodity 
framework for the EU has been developed and outlined in a range of publications44  
arising from both this project and from the previous related research. Through the 
incorporation of a range of public good compliance criteria, this type of framework 
would greatly increase the societal value of the DPs. From a farmer perspective they 
would have the added advantages of increasing: 
• the economic justification for DPs themselves  
• the acceptability of the DPs to EU taxpayers 
• the justification of the DPs under WTO rules. 
 
This scenario was summarised by Dunne and O’Connell 2000d as follows: 
“In the future the DPs could be made conditional on a range of compliance 
criteria for the entire farm and would most likely include minimum and 
maximum stocking density limits. Other compliance criteria could incorporate 
public good and consumer values in relation to food safety, landscape, 
environment, animal welfare and production technology and possibly even a 
“homestead” maintenance requirement.  
 
Such changes would incorporate a number of “Public Goods” into farming 
methods and these are product attributes of growing value as affluence 
increases. These public good values are becoming a marketable entity in an 
increasingly affluent society like the EU and in sophisticated markets around 
the globe.”  
 
3.15 Towards a new Dynamic 
Linking the payment to the “production process”, such as the management of the crop 
or the animal would increase the capitalisation of the payment into the management 
process itself. But, an increase in the capitalisation of the payment into the farming 
process is far less restrictive to new entrants than the contemporary arrangement 
whereby the payments are capitalised into the operating assets of animals and land 
and consequently future entry costs.  
 
                                                          
44 Dunne 1996f and 1997d, Dunne and O’Connell 1998, 1999 and 2000abcd and 
2002ab. 
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Therefore, linking the payment to the production process per se would encourage new 
entrants into farming, a highly desirable long-term objective. And, assuming the 
“process” could be properly defined, the payment system could be used to encourage 
the provision of public services to society. Furthermore, if feasible the “farming 
processes concept” could be incorporated into the consumers’ image of the farm 
product, either directly as an intrinsic attribute or through better marketing. Overall, 
additional economic benefits could arise for the farmers which could manifest itself in 
the form of expanded product sales and/or higher product prices. 
 
If such a policy framework was implemented, cattle farmers will quickly adjust their 
production methods in response to any extra revenue they may receive or penalties 
they might incur. The main administrative operational control point for the DPs would 
then switch from the individual animal or crop to the overall operational management 
decisions for the “entire farm”. This would substantially reduce the scale of the 
administrative burden plus bureaucratic intrusion into the operational details on farms 
and introduce a whole new dynamic into the entire agricultural policy and farming 
interface, Dunne and O’Connell 2000d.  
 
Within such a policy administrative system it would be possible to achieve: 
 
• better targeting of the DPs towards economic and social goals by varying 
the mix of the unit value of the farmer/household and area components of 
payments used to distribute the DP 
 
• a reduction, by possibly five fold, in the number of administrative control 
nodes and related costs due to the shift of emphases from the details of the 
individual animals to the farm as the primary “operational unit” of the 
farm itself 
 
• a reduction in the “paperwork” for both farmers and the controlling 
agency. Animals could still be traced but without the need for an 
immediate day to day log of their exact location and premium status   
 
• a reduction in the number of inspections required to achieve the desired 
level of compliance. The inspections will relate to the entire farm and it’s 
operational characteristics rather than chasing the profile details for 
individual animals 
 
• a reduction in the compliance costs for both the farmer and the controlling 
agency by reducing the day to day management needs for cross checking 
animals ages, sex, premium status and retention periods. Individual farm 
inspections may be more complex and take longer but there will be much 
fewer inspections required 
 
• farming practices compatible with the fundamental economics of the 
product being produced, and animal numbers and the inputs used will 
better reflect the value of the product sales 
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• the production of both the volume and type of products that could respond 
to the consumers valuation of these products. Unlike the animal-based 
DPs, this should assist in reconnecting farmers with consumers. 
 
With such a DP administravtive structure, after an appropriate time lag45, cattle 
farming would revert to the situation where the market based margin of sales value 
less direct costs will determine the animal numbers, type, carcass weights, slaughter 
dates, stocking densities and the mix of internal and external feed used.  
 
Because of the unprecedented nature of this type of administrative arrangement, it is 
difficult to predict the actual scale of the decline in animal numbers, the level of 
prices and the knock-on effects on the farm enterprise mix. But the expenditure on 
concentrates and fertilisers will decrease to reflect the decline in animal and crop 
prices, animal numbers and the changes in the farm enterprise mix. Preliminary 
estimates46 would suggest that compared to 1999, the expenditure reductions on 
purchased feeds and  fertilisers could be of the order of €190 and €60 (£150 and £50) 
million respectively.  This would be the equivalent of about one million tonnes of 
concentrates and about 300,000 tonnes of fertilisers. 
 
A “Foresight” for the beef industry 2010 was prepared and presented at the Teagasc 
Agri-Food millennium conference in 1999, (Dunne et al 1999). This reviewed the 
range of options for farm income support and the related economic environment. Five 
possible income support mechanisms were identified but it was concluded that the 
new concept and general framework for DPs outlined above was the most likely 
outcome. For Ireland this new concept was described as:  
“… using a schedule similar to the Farm Retirement Scheme (FRS) but with 
the Rural Environment Protection Schemes (REPS) type requirements.”  
 
This foresight also concluded that: 
“ the reorientation of the payments will be conducive to the production of 
“consumer oriented beef” requiring new technological inputs on cattle farms 
and at processing factories and in marketing.” 
 
Under the scenario for 2010 it was envisaged that there will be three broad categories 
of beef farmers in Ireland. These are: 
 
• “2,000 to 3,000 large-scale full-time commercial farmers, specialising in 
providing finished animals under "contract" to beef processors. 
 
• 30,000 to 50,000 part-time farmers who are earning a significant portion of 
their income from cattle farming. These will be primarily engaged in 
producing calves, weanlings and young animals from both dairy and suckler 
cow farms and supplying stores or feeder cattle to specialist finishers and for 
the live export trade.  
 
                                                          
45 Such a time lag would have multiple components which are partly additive; mainly incorporating 
administrative, economic and biological aspects.  
 
46 Dunne and O’Connell 2000d 
 44
• 30,000 to 40,000 other farmers who would be primarily engaged in producing 
weanlings from the suckler cow herd. Most of these will be earning less than a 
third of the average industrial wage from farming. This group will be 
supplying weanlings to other farmers or for the live export trade.  
 
In addition the beef industry would have output of calves and younger cattle from 
commercial dairy herds. 
 
Category 1 will depend mainly on the marketplace for their income and if they did 
not exist beef processors would have to become involved in finishing in order to 
guarantee a supply of slaughter cattle.  
 
Categories 2 and 3 above will be substantially dependent, as at present, on direct 
payments for most of their farm income.  
 
In the absence of payments that would be tied directly to animals, cattle prices all 
along the chain will decline. The live export trade for calves and weanlings to the 
Continent and the store trade to Third Countries will provide competition and 
ensure reasonable prices for calves and weanlings and finished animals. This 
trade for calves and weanlings could be affected by the elimination of the calf 
processing scheme and the consequential realignment of the calf and weanling 
trade within the EU and by increased supplies from new Member States in the 
longer term.  
 
Decoupling of the direct payments from the animals and the incorporation of 
public good values into the direct payments system will allow cattle prices along 
the chain to reflect more clearly than at present the final market value of the 
beef47. 
 
Reduced supplies are expected as a result of the Agenda 2000 CAP reform 
changes already agreed and further reductions in supply are likely to occur if 
direct payments are decoupled from production, as outlined above. In these 
circumstances we would envisage that the total number of plants involved in 
slaughtering would be significantly reduced, probably to a level of four or five.  
 
Consumption of beef within the EU is likely at best to remain static, despite the 
reductions in wholesale prices. Prices in the EU are, however, in a free trade 
scenario, likely to remain above world market prices.  An increase in volume of 
Irish exports sold on European markets could be expected.  
 
The extent of the reduction of the beef price differential between Ireland and the 
EU will depend on the combined effect of:  
 
• the increased market opportunities provided by the decline in supplies 
in mainland Europe which could arise as a result of the lower prices 
and decoupled payments 
 
                                                          
47 For details of subsequent evidence and implications of decoupling on cattle cohort prices and cattle 
systems margins, see Dunne (2007) in situation and outlook for cattle. 
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• the extent to which the production and marketing of Irish beef can be 
refocused on the demands of the EU marketplace.” 
 
The Foresight also outlined a series of core technologies and related competencies 
needed in both the beef production and processing sectors for 2010. These were: 
• “Payment for quality 
• Consumer safety 
• Consistent quality 
• Welfare and environmentally compatible production systems.” 
 
3.16 The 2nd BSE Crisis 
The Agenda 2000 agreement which was scheduled to apply until 2006 was phased-in 
over three years 2000 to 2003. Over the phasing-in period and in three equal steps, the 
institutional intervention price for beef was to be reduced by 20% together with 
implementation of the new and larger DPs.  
 
A renewed level of confidence was beginning to emerge among Irish cattle farmers in 
2000 as cattle prices had recovered from the poor levels prevailing in 1999. Suddenly, 
another BSE crisis occurred in October-November, first in France and later in 
Germany and Spain. As a consequence, beef consumption levels declined abruptly 
and markets were effectively re-nationalised and normal trade flows for beef and live 
cattle were severely disrupted.  
 
These market problems were swiftly reflected in cattle prices in Ireland, especially for 
cull-cows and the lower grades of cattle. The poor market outlook for beef was also 
exacerbated by the phasing-in of the planned reductions in intervention prices. 
Consequently there was much apprehension about the effectiveness of a number of 
the operational details of the revised EU market support system. These included, the 
level at which it would be activated, the capacity of the intervention system and/or 
other supply withdrawal mechanisms to cope with the extent of the immediate 
oversupply plus the location and characteristics of future market outlets for this 
surplus beef. Cattle farmers also faced uncertainties, would there be, as in the past, 
DP “top-ups” to support their incomes or would this be denied due to EU budget 
constraints. The BSE related market and trading complications were further 
accentuated in 2001 following a substantial outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease 
(FMD) in the UK and a related but isolated incident in Ireland. 
 
In response to the abrupt and sharp decline in demand and consumer confidence, a 
suite of EU wide supply control and consumer rebuilding measures were introduced. 
The main EU policy initiatives were: 
• the mandatory testing of all carcasses from cattle over 30 months48 of age 
                                                          
48 While the over 30 months testing was applied to all bovines, its primary aim was as a quality control 
proxy to identify potentially BSE infected cull-cows with the objective of removing them from the 
food chain. In Ireland, perhaps inadvertently, a significant cohort of other cattle became enveloped in 
this BSE testing system. Ireland, unlike most other EU Member States, retained its tradition of steer 
beef production with its long production chain. Consequently, a significant portion of slaughter 
animals in Ireland would be over 30 months. Apart from the direct cost of the test itself, the BSE 
testing system introduced another animal age related market and trading criterion that cattle farmers 
had to contend with in addition to those in the already encountered via the complicated and highly 
regulated animal-based DP system. In essence, the market and related cattle prices became segmented 
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• the immediate introduction of a scheme for Purchase For Destruction (PFD) 
of over 30 month animals at a guaranteed price49 
• the redefinition of eligible suckler-cows50 for SCP compliance 
• changes in premium rights51 within the DP scheme, and  
• intervention purchases under special conditions52 (SPS).   
 
In response to this unprecedented situation, a comprehensive review of these EU and 
other supply control options was undertaken and a series of recommendations were 
developed and made available in a range of formats to policy makers and 
stakeholders, Dunne and Shanahan 2001. The main findings are summarised here. 
 
Many of the BSE related policy initiatives undertaken to reduce supplies had serious 
knock-on implications. For example, the increase the value of the DPs together with 
the adjustment of the access conditions would further exacerbate the serious structural 
weaknesses already identified as inherent in the animal-based DP system. For details, 
see section 3.12 above and the earlier research findings by Dunne 1996f and 1997b, 
Dunne and O’Connell 1998, End of Project report No. 4313. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
based on the 30 month BSE test, and this was particularly so subsequently in periods with an over 
supply of slaughter animals.  
 
49 The PFD scheme agreed in Ireland was partly financed (30%) by the Irish Government. Under this 
scheme, steers and heifers over 30 months of age were purchased for destruction, without a 
requirement for the BSE test, by the Department of Agriculture at the equivalent of €2.50/kg carcass 
weight. Once established, this essentially became a minimum price for most cattle because farmers 
could simply retain the animals until they reached the required age. The alternatives for the farmers 
were (a) sell the over 30 month cattle in the open market probably at a discount even allowing for the 
cost of the BSE test and associated risks or (b) switch to accelerated beef production and incur 
additional feed costs and market the animals under 30 months which in a surplus market would 
probably encounter lower price. 
 
50 The definition of suckler-cows, for the purpose of collecting the Suckler Cow Premium (SCP), was 
changed to allow for the inclusion of up to 20% dry heifers. This was later extended to 40% on a 
voluntary basis but with a 15% compulsory dimension. Depending on the level of uptake, this could 
reduce almost pro rata, after an appropriate time lag, the future supply of calves and beef from the 
suckler herd. In addition, Member States with unused SCP quota entitlements had them withdrawn for 
the foreseeable future. The reduction in the supply of calves arising from both of these policy measures 
would inevitably intensify the problem of the capitalisation of the value of the SBPs into the then 
reduced supply of young beef animals.  
 
51 For each Member State, a phased tightening of the stocking density limits was introduced in 2002 
and 2003 on the more intensive farms for animals eligible for Special Beef Premium (SBPs) and SCPs 
to encourage extensive production methods and reduce future supplies. In addition there were further 
adjustments to the value and conditions for SBPs. Under Agenda 2000, the increase in the value of the 
single SBP for Bulls proportionately larger than that for the double period SBP for Steers. Now, under 
the BSE measures a second stage SBP was introduced for “castrate bulls” on a temporary basis to help 
stabilise the market for bull beef. 
  
52 Over 800,000 tonnes of carcass beef was removed from the EU market, most of it was removed 
entirely from the food chain by a combination of PFD, SPS, FMD and BSE culling schemes. The 
details of the various policy initiatives and their impacts in Ireland are outlined in the annual situation 
and outlook report for cattle by Dunne 2001 and 2002.  
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Since EU budgetary constraints were a factor limiting the choice policy initiatives 
selected to address the beef market imbalance arising from the BSE crisis, a number 
of low cost alternative policy options were developed and their relative merits 
compared53. These were designed to take advantage of the very wide diversity that 
existed in cattle production systems and producer prices for beef within the EU. 
Unlike in the past, individual Member States were encouraged to voluntarily 
contribute 30% towards the cost of the supply control mechanisms implemented 
within their jurisdiction. This financial facility was only implemented by some 
Member States, like Ireland, but not by all. Since individual Member States had a 
financial incentive to avoid direct contributions to product withdrawal schemes, the 
overall approach was rather patchy and inconsistent. An agreed sharing of the extra 
financial burden in advance would have facilitated the exploitation of the lowest cost 
option. For example, an agreed solidarity budget key based on the degree of decline in 
consumption in each Member State would provide a great national incentive to 
recover consumption and thereby assist in rebalancing the market more promptly.  
 
Another fundamental weakness in the PFD, and/or similar supply reduction type of 
approaches, was the inherent direct economic conflict between the cost of reducing 
supplies and the possible implications for farmers of withdrawing specific animals 
which were required for the administration of the SBPs and extensification farm 
income supports. For example, appropriate (lowest cost) slaughter animals may have 
to be retained by farmers for a specified period to enable them to draw down their 
animal-based payment entitlements. Although perhaps not immediately appropriate, 
this conflict could be avoided by decoupling the animal-based payments and 
administering this revenue using historical records to generate (a) a personalised 
payment or (b) an area-based payment or (c) as a combination of both (a) and (b), 
Dunne and Shanahan 2001.   
 
Such a direct payment system had already been devised and proposed by Dunne 
1996f and 1997b, Dunne and O’Connell 1998 following the earlier BSE crisis in 1996 
and remained one of the longstanding objectives of this research project. The 2nd BSE 
crisis reaffirmed the almost undisputed logic of the requirement for a complete 
overhaul of the animal-based DP system within the EU and the decoupling of all of 
the CAP product-based payments to a more suitable alternative income support 
system.  
 
These research findings and the corresponding outline recommendations for 
alternative EU payment systems continued to form the basis of both formal and 
informal communications with stakeholders at various meetings, seminars and radio 
                                                          
53 For example, as alternatives to the PFD, the cost per tonne to remove a cull-cow beef in Spain was 
only about €1,500 whereas the cost of removing a similar volume of bull beef in France was €2,670. In 
addition, if farmers were paid on a per animal basis (i.e. a bounty) this would further reduce the budget 
cost because it would eliminate the incentive for the farmer to increase carcass weights and 
simultaneously reduce the feed cost inputs. The cost efficiency of the bounty system could be further 
improved by using a weekly/monthly or seasonally adjusted bid-offer system which could be easily 
based on prevailing cattle supplies and beef prices. Such approaches would have the added advantage 
of attracting the lower quality animals, including those with a higher risk of BSE, and the resulting  
reduced carcass volume would also minimise both the volume and cost of disposal on the 
consequential  meat and bone meat plus specified risk material. 
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interviews. As in the past, this also provided substantial encouragement with regard to 
the acceptability of the decoupling approach being adopted and valuable feedback 
was obtained which assisted in refining future policy options, compliance conditions 
and related operational administrative instruments.   
 
Despite all of the market disruption and turbulence arising from the current BSE 
predicament, the annual incomes of Irish cattle farmers were largely maintained 
throughout this period, This was achieved by a combination of the EU policy 
initiatives such as the PFD and through periodic and prudent adjustments by the 
Minister for Agriculture of the phasing of the annual pay-out rates for the animal-
based DPs54.  
 
3.17 EU proposals for decoupling 
For over a decade, and especially for cattle farming post the 2nd BSE crisis, it was 
becoming increasingly evident that EU society was placing a declining or perhaps for 
beef a negative value on extra units of food production but an increasing value on any 
public goods consumed in the production process. As a consequence, the farm mix of 
agricultural production and public goods that EU society is prepared to support 
financially is also changing. Therefore, the level and components of farm income 
support within the EU in the 21st century should reflect this rebalancing. 
 
In preparation for the upcoming Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the CAP and to meet 
this evolving domestic and wider EU requirement for an acceptable methodology for 
the decoupling of the animal-based DPs, an international conference paper was 
prepared and presented at the Xth EAAE congress in Spain, Dunne and O’Connell 
2002. The paper entitled “a  multi-commodity EU policy framework incorporating 
public good criteria into the direct payment system in agriculture” outlined the 
rationale, implications and methodology for decoupling for all of the EU commodity-
based DPs. Building on the earlier template for decoupling outlined by Dunne and 
O’Connell 1998, and 1999 the paper provided additional supporting evidence on the 
necessity and inevitability of decoupling within the context of the evolving policy and 
market situation both within the EU and internationally. 
 
Almost simultaneously and against expectations, the EU MTR proposals55 for the 
CAP recommended that all crop and animal-based premiums be converted into area 
type payments. The EU policy shift to a decoupled Single Farm Payment56 (SFP) 
outlined in their MTR proposals published in 2002 was almost identical to the 
                                                          
54 For details see the NFS margins for the cattle enterprise published in the annual situation and 
outlook report, by Dunne (various issues). 
 
55 Commission of the European Communities (2002)  Mid-Term Review of the Common Agricultural 
Policy: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Council of 
Ministers, Brussels COM (394) final 
 
56 The structure of the SFP was almost identical to that outlined earlier by Dunne and O’Connell in 
1998 and 2002. The two main exceptions were: (a) the architecture of the SFP was entirely area-based 
whereas the Dunne and O’Connell proposal used a combination of a farmer/household element and an 
area-based component to reduce the extent of the capitalisation of the SFP value into future land values 
and costs for new farm entrants, (b) the SFP also introduced an additional compliance requirement in 
relation to farm safety. 
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concepts, architecture and compliance requirements for the framework presented 
earlier by Dunne and O’Connell in 1998, 1999 and 2002. In the MTR proposal, all 
crop and animal-based payments would be converted to future area–based 
entitlements using the number of historical payments received and the related area 
farmed in the reference period.  
 
The EU proposal for the SFP was initially rejected by both the Irish and French 
authorities and by almost all of the Irish farm organisations plus the agri-business 
representative bodies. Overall, there was a reluctance to fully embrace the concept of 
decoupling the product-based payments due to concerns in relation to: 
• a probable re-distribution within farming itself of the indirect benefits and 
costs associated with the animal-based DPs which could be significant but 
were very difficult to quantify, (see section 3.12 above) and  
• the future cost and revenue implications for the farm organisations 
themselves and agri-business arising from anticipated reductions in the 
volumes of both farm inputs used and outputs produced with knock-on 
impacts on business turnover and margins plus member subscriptions to 
the appropriate representative organisations. 
 
As already noted in section 3.15 above, such general concerns had a degree of 
authenticity, “it is difficult to predict the actual scale of the decline in animal 
numbers, the level of prices and the knock-on effects on the farm enterprise mix. But 
the expenditure on concentrates and fertilisers will decrease to reflect the decline in 
animal and crop prices, animal numbers and the changes in the farm enterprise mix”, 
Dunne and O’Connell 2000d.  
 
However, the feedback obtained by the project team from a series of seminars and 
presentations on the MTR decoupling proposals made at farmer and agri-business 
meetings was rather different. Particularly for those farmers heavily reliant on the 
cattle enterprise, most were well aware that almost all of their gross margin and their 
total income were dependent on the DPs and their related compliance conditions and 
costs. Equally, they were concerned at how the evolving DP system had progressively 
disconnected farmers and farming from the ultimate consumer of their beef.  This was 
entirely consistent with the earlier feedback from farmers over a number of years, post 
the 1st BSE crisis in 1996, in relation to the original proposed methodology and 
related compliance conditions for converting all crop and animal-based DPs to a 
single farm level payment system, Dunne 1996f and 1997b, Dunne and O’Connell 
1998, 1999 and 2000d. 
 
For most farmers it was immediately obvious that the SFP could release them from 
the administrative burden, economic and bureaucratic straightjacket into which they 
had progressively become enveloped with the various phases of CAP reform since 
1992. After a decade of EU policy reforms, the SFP system provided farmers with 
their first realistic prospect of maintaining the future value of their existing DPs 
without the need for endless counts of eligible and non-eligible animals, matching 
dates of birth of animals with applications for premiums and critical census dates, and 
two separate methods of determining stocking densities.  
 
 50
Similar feedback through various institutional channels led within months to a volte-
face on the Irish stance in relation to the SFP proposal, much to the surprise of most 
of the other EU Member States but especially France which was particularly opposed 
the entire concept of the SFP. In January 2003, the EU Agricultural Council adopted a 
package of proposals to reform the CAP and introduce the SFP based on historical 
individual farm entitlements. However, in June 2003, further modifications were 
agreed which gave Member States a degree of choice in the implementation of 
decoupling, but Ireland elected to implement the system as originally proposed in the 
MTR and to its original time schedule. 
 
For Ireland, the EU policy move from the product-based DP system to the SFP could 
in the future provide scope and opportunities to differentiate, re-position or even re-
brand Irish farm products, especially for beef sales within the EU and in other export 
markets. Various aspects and implications of such a market segmentation approach to 
the evolving EU food production policy were addressed in a series of papers 
presented at professional international conferences in the US, Italy, Greece, Norway, 
Slovenia, and Sweden, Dunne and O’Connell 2002b, 2003a,b, 2004a,b, 2006 and 
Dunne 2005b. Such diverse audiences provided valuable feedback on both the 
consequences of the shift to the SFP and possible future evolution of farming and in 
particular of beef supplies and markets. 
 
In addition to the market aspects, these papers also elaborated on how the EU policy 
shift from product-based price support to DP system(s) of various formats would have 
implications for the economics of production per se, resource conservation and 
change the mix of private and public costs and benefits. Future farming systems 
within the EU could exploit more eco-friendly production methods and produce a 
more diverse range of food products. However, a more complete economic 
exploitation of these opportunities will require further definition of the compliance 
criteria for the farming systems plus the formulation of appropriate marketing 
strategies for the increasingly diverse consumer markets arising from an increase in 
general economic prosperity and the progressive enlargement of the EU itself. 
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5. Appendix 
 
Chart A  
EU expenditure on premiums
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Source: OJ, C 290, vol 45 (2002) 
 
Table 1: EU expenditure of premiums  
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 
Premium type 
 
(Mio EUR) 
Extensification 389 438 507 569 706 714 715 914 891
Suckler cow 886 1052 1520 1522 1652 1658 1629 1777 1950
Special Beef  657 957 1407 1239 1341 1207 1299 1530 1788
Total 1932 2447 3434 3330 3699 3579 3643 4221 4629
  
Change (1994 = 100) 
Extensification 100 113 130 146 181 184 184 235 229
Suckler cow 100 119 172 172 186 187 184 201 220
Special beef 100 146 214 189 204 184 198 233 272
Total  100   127 178 172 191 185 188 218 240
  
Individual premiums as % of Total 
Extensification 20.1 17.9 14.8 17.1 19.1 20.0 19.6 21.7 19.2 
Suckler cow 45.9 43.0 44.2 45.7 44.7 46.3 44.7 42.1 42.1 
Special Beef  34.0 39.1 41.0 37.2 36.2 33.7 35.7 36.2 38.6 
Source: Court of Auditors, special report No 5/2002 on extensification premium 
and payment schemes in the common organisation of the market for beef and veal. 
OJ, C 290, vol 45, 25th November 2002 
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Table 2: Expenditure on premiums in Ireland57 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 
1999 
2000 2001 2002 
 
2003 2004 2005 
 
 
 
ECU a million  
  
€b million 
Extensification 58 71 75 100 144 145 157 163 165
Suckler cow 85 121 144 228 196 257 244 198 101
Special Beef  113 165 202 256 230 271 280 263 246
Total  256 357 421 584 570 673 681 624 512
 
Slaughter 
  
73
 
126 
 
141 134 65
  
Change (1994 = 100) 
Extensification 100 122 129 172 248 250 271 281 284
Suckler cow 100 142 169 268 231 302 287 232 119
Special Beef  100 146 179 227 204 240 248 232 218
Total 100 139 164 228 223 262 266 244 200
  
Individual premiums as % of Total 
Extensification 22.6 19.9 17.8 17.1 25.3 21.5 23.1 26.1 32.2
Suckler cow 33.2 33.9 34.2 39.0 34.4 38.2 35.8 31.7 19.7
Special Beef  44.2 46.2 48.0 43.9 40.3 40.3 41.1 42.2 48.1
      
Source: aEU, EAGGF Guarantee expenditure against the appropriate year 
 bDepartment of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food,  claims submitted to FEOGA 
Guarantee Fund - payments by sector and scheme, 1973 -2006, compendium 
of Irish agricultural statistics, 2008 
 
 
                                                          
57 The annual “drawdown” of payments depends on the combination of the following: 
• the National and/or individual farm quotas for premium rights 
• the number and mix of “eligible” animals available within the country each year  
• the number of eligible animals available on farms where they can avail of the premiums, 
conditional on retention periods and/or subject to the SBP 90 animal limit for age 
categories  
• the punctuality with which farmers apply for the payments within each year  
• the value of the premium payment per eligible animal for the appropriate year (see 
appendix Table 3) 
• the periodic annual administrative adjustments in the rate of “payout” of the premiums, i.e. 
size (%) of the 1st payment in the autumn for SCP and SBP, thereby affecting the 
distribution between consecutive years 
• extensufication payments in a specific year relate to SCP and SBP claims for the previous 
year  
• the scale of and changes in the annual administrative lags at both farm and institutional 
level. 
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Table 3: The evolution of the Extensification premium 
EC 
Regulatio
n 
No. 
Application year Premium 
value1 
ECU/€ 
Extensification 
Stocking 
density 
LU/ha 
SBP/SCP 
stocking 
density 
LU/ha 
2066/92 1993 30 < 1.4  
 
2417/95 1995 36.23 < 1.4  
 
2222/96 1997 36 
52 
< 1.4 
< 1.0 
 
 
 
1254/99 Single threshold system 
(Option 1) 
2000 onwards 
 
 
100 
 
 
≤ 1.4 
 
 
 
< 2  
but reduced to 
1.8 by 20032 
1254/99 
 
 
Two-tier system 
(Option 2) 
2000 and 2001 
 
 
2002 
 
 
2003 
 
 
33 
66 
 
40 
80 
 
40 
80 
 
 
≤ 2 and ≥ 1.6 
< 1.6 
 
≤ 1.8 and ≥ 1.4 
< 1.4 
 
≤ 1.8 and ≥ 1.4 
< 1.4 
 
 
< 2 
 
 
< 1.92 
 
 
< 1.82 
 
 
1Values presented were in ECU pre 2000 and subsequently were in € 
2As per Regulation 1512/2001, introduced after the 2nd BSE crisis
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Table 4: Extensification Premiums and Livestock Units 
 
Extensification MacSharry Agenda 2000 
Animal 
Type 
Premium 
payable 
Animals 
included 
Weighting 
LU 
Animals 
Included 
Weighting 
LU 
 
Dairy cows No quota or all 1.0 All 1.0 
Beef cows Yes only, SCP 
applications 
1.0 All 1.0 
Replacement 
heifer  
(suckler herd)
yes, under 
Agenda 
2000  
 
Zero 
 
0 
up to 20% 
of SCP 
applications 
0.6  
if < 24 
months and 
not calved 
Male > 24 
months 
Yes only, SBP 
applications 
1.0 All 1.0 
Male 6 to 24 
months 
Yes only, SBP 
applications 
0.6 All 0.6 
Female > 24 
months 
No Zero 0 All 1.0 
Female 6 to 
24 months 
No Zero 0 All 0.6 
Male and 
female < 6 
months 
 
No 
 
Zero 
 
0 
 
Zero 
 
0 
Ewes  
No 
only, ewe 
premium 
applications 
 
0.15 
only, ewe 
premium 
applications 
 
0.15 
Lambs No Zero 0 Zero 0 
Notes:  
SCP = suckler cow premium 
SBP = special beef premium,  payable on male (steer) beef animals at 10  and 22 
months under MacSharry but under agenda 2000 the age is reduced by one  month 
to 9 and 21 months. 
 
Source: Dunne et al (2000) Working paper No. 6 
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Table 5 Evolution of Premium rates 
 SCP1 SCP+NP2 SBP3 
steers 
SBP3 
bulls 
 
MacSharry (1992 to 1999) 
Extensification4 
“top up” on basic premium (%) 24.6 21.1 32.3 26.4 
 
 
Agenda 2000 (2002 to 2007) 
Basic premium value change 
(%)  
38.5 33.0 37.2 55.6 
 
Extensification  Option 1 
(single threshold system)  
(@  < 1.4LU/ha)  
 
 “top up” on basic premium (%) 50.0 44.6 66.9 47.9 
 
Extensification5  Option 2 
(Two- tier system) 
@  < 1.4 LU/ha         
 
“top up” on basic premium (%) 39.9 35.6 53.3 38.2 
@ 1.4 to 1.8 LU/ha     
“top up” on basic premium (%) 19.9 17.8 26.7 19.1 
1
Suckler Cow Premium, basic 
2
Suckler Cow Premium including National Premium “ top-up” arising from the disbursement from the “National envelope” 
component which was funded by the EU under the Agenda 2000 agreement 
3
 Special beef Premium  
4
In 1996, a larger extensification premium was introduced in situations where the stocking density was less than 1 LU as this 
was of only limited interest in Ireland it was ignored to reduce the complexity of the analysis 
5
For simplicity of presentation, the phasing-in period (2000 and 2001) for the new extensification payment and its related 
stocking rate requirements were excluded. 
 
Source: Dunne et al (2000) Working paper No. 6 
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Table 6: Country profiles of animals collecting extensification 
 
Year  19941 19941 19992 20002 
 Percent collecting extensification on: 
Country Suckler 
Cows 
(SCP) 
Special Beef 
Premium (SBP) 
Animals 
(SCP + SBP) 
Animals 
(SCP + SBP) 
Greece n/a n/a 53.9 67.9 
Portugal 72.7 19.4 67.6 62.4 
Spain n/a n/a 93.6 68.9 
Ireland 88.6 71.8 75.0 78.5 
Italy 23.3 18.4 45.9 31.3 
Austria n/a n/a 62.1 39.3 
Finland n/a n/a 69.9 56.2 
Sweden n/a n/a 94.0 68.0 
UK 81.6 65.6 80.7 76.0 
Germany 59.3 19.9 43.9 28.0 
Netherlands n/a n/a 19.6 7.5 
France 85.2 62.9 81.1 68.2 
Denmark n/a n/a 25.0 27.7 
Belgium n/a n/a 27.7 9.5 
Luxembourg 82.0 84.3 84.5 48.9 
 
EU15 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
72.1 
 
62.9 
Sources:  1Dunne (1997c), 2 Source: Court of Auditors, special report No 5/2002 
OJ, C 290, vol 45, 25th November 2002 
 
n/a = no data available 
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